Heidegger

Cologne 16-May-2008

Bob Guevara schrieb Thu, 15 May 2008 23:20:42 -0700:

> Dreyfus BITW p60
>
> The mode of argument will have to change along with the
>
> questions. Heidegger does not expect to prove his theses and
>
> thereby overcome the traditional subject/object distinction, or its
>
> more recent variations such as the internalist/externalist debate
>
> concerning meaning. “An analytic does not do any proving at all by
>
> the rules of the ‘logic of consistency”‘ (363) [315] . But he does not
>
> think his inability to provide proofs results in a standoff, such as,
> for
>
> example, John Searle and Donald Davidson confronting each
>
> other over whether to do philosophy from a first-person, subjective
>
> or a third-person, objective perspective. Heidegger proposes to get
>
> out of this traditional Cartesian confrontation by focusing on the
>
> more basic way of being that he calls existence. He will seek to show
>
> that the traditional picture is prima facie implausible and will
>
> sketch out an alternative, viz. that subjects and objects can be
>
> understood only in terms of being-in-the-world. This alternative is
>
> to be “concretely demonstrated” (359) [311] .
>
> Heidegger proposes to demonstrate that the situated use of
>
> equipment is in some sense prior to just looking at things and that
>
> what is revealed by use is ontologically more fundamental than the
>
> substances with determinate, context-free properties revealed by
>
> detached contemplation. (This is the subject of this chapter.) But
>
> to see why the traditional model of self-sufficient subjects related
> to
>
> self-sufficient objects by means of mental content is never
> appropriate
>
> we need to look more deeply. Thus, Heidegger seeks to
>
> supplantthe tradition by showing that the ways of being of equipment
>
> andsubstances, and of actors and contemplators, presuppose
>
> a background understanding of being—originary transcendence
>
> or being-in-the-world. (See chapter 5.)
>
> To begin with, we need to recall that the stand Dasein takes on
>
> itself, its existence, is not some inner thought or experience; it is
> the
>
> way Dasein acts. (What makes a Japanese baby a Japanese baby is first
>
> and foremost what it does and how things show up for it, and only
>
> derivatively its thoughts, assuming it has any.) Dasein takes a stand
>
> on itself through its involvement with things and people.
>
> In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of
>
> the activities we pursue and the things we take care of. (BP, 159) To
> exist
>
> then means, among other things, relating to oneself by being with
> beings. (BP,
>
> 157)
>

ME: Dreyfus is a breath of fresh air in this babble. It gets interesting
after the latter “or” in the subject heading.

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Posted on Sunday, May 18th, 2008 at 6:03 am
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