Heidegger

>Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> >ME: If one has already accepted predicate logic as given, then Axiom 0
> >is trivially true. But I do not accept predicate logic as given, nor
> >the concept of truth/falsity that pertains to predicate logic. For the
> >sake of argument, I have shown that even allowing Axiom […]

Michael Eldred wrote:
>ME: If one has already accepted predicate logic as given, then Axiom 0
>is trivially true. But I do not accept predicate logic as given, nor
>the concept of truth/falsity that pertains to predicate logic. For the
>sake of argument, I have shown that even allowing Axiom 0 to stand
>still […]

In a message dated 11/24/2007 8:59:35 AM Eastern Standard Time,
crifasian at gmail.com writes:
> chaney525 wrote:
>
> >The physical causes
> >of color pertain to the dynamics of energy and to the qualities of
> >physical matter, but also to the distinct sensory order. The two are
> >irreducible - the physical order is irreducible to […]

Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>however, since I-2 am a phenomenological reality and there is no
>>>>evidence that I-2 am self-instantiating, it follows that I-2 am (or
>>>>may be) generated by one or more meta-phenomenal realities (ie
>>>>realities of type 1 and/or type 3).
>Is it possible that the meta-phenomenal “reality” behind “me” […]

In a message dated 11/24/2007 8:49:49 AM Eastern Standard Time,
jPolanik at nc.rr.com writes:
phenomenological inquiry needs to assume an adult view of the relation
between names and the things named: no phenomenon, not even the
originary phenomenon, tells us its own name; and, hence, the name we
give it does not derive from it. the name for it […]

In a message dated 11/24/2007 4:33:08 AM Eastern Standard Time,
artefact at t-online.de writes:
ME: If one has already accepted predicate logic as given, then Axiom 0 is
trivially true. But I do not accept predicate logic as given, nor the concept
of truth/falsity that pertains to predicate logic. For the sake of argument,
I have shown that even allowing […]

Joseph Polanik wrote:
> >>1: existential or physical reality (ie existents; or, anything made of
> >>matter/energy and spacetime).
>
> >>2: phenomenological reality (subject or object of any experience)
>
> >>3: ontological reality (ie being; or, more generally, anything that
> >>has a reality independent of our experience of it (ie a metaphenomenal
> […]

Slippery Sam aka Dr. Fallacia writes:
What of a saying that does not predicate a predicate of a subject?
A pure, thoughtful saying that sees the originary phenomenon?
Jud:
All such sayings are simply antecedently expressed notions already armed
and primed with covert predication, where the ontological implicature is
already […]

Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>if I understand your terminology correctly, there *would* be a
>>difference in reality type between the phenomenological experiencer
>>and the meta-phenomenal realities that generate the phenomenological
>>experiencer.
>>here is my inventory of reality types again, this time the list is
>>numbered.
>>1: existential or physical reality (ie existents; […]

Dear Jud;
Having no place to hide infers a hiddeness to start with or, I would say
psychologically, an unconsciousness; or what the lads on the list are beating
their gums about, the CPI which is the halfway house to becoming conscious. Also,
your reference to the heart as center for the self: check out the chakras of
the […]