Heidegger

> michaelP wrote:
>
> >Joe speaking of Heidegger not asking your question:
>
> >>he does not ask ‘is there Being?
>
> >Joe, it seems to me that your question unasked by Heidegger (but
> >presumably asked by you) is a nonsense question since be-ing is not a
> >being;
>
> I doubt that what you mean by ‘be-ing’ is the same as what I mean by
> either ‘Being’ or ‘being’. either one would refer to the ontological
> (non-physical, metaphenomenal) reality type. ‘Being’ is just the
> collective version of ‘being’.

Remember, be-ing {typographically I am distinguishing it from being {= a
thing, an entity, etc} by the use of the hyphen in order to emphasise the
verbal rather than the nominal} is not (but the be-ing of what is {some
thing, etc}, and so it is not (because it is not any thing, not a being) a
“reality type” and not a “collective version of ‘being’”.

> some people prefer to think that there is
> only one Mind that all humans participate in somehow while others think
> that there are individual minds, one per person. similarly for
> Being/being, Self/self, Soul/soul, Spirit/spirit, Existence/existent,
> Reality/reality and so on. its a common convention to capitalize the
> collective version of a noun to contrast it with the particular version
> of the same noun.

Nope, Joe, be-ing is not and thus is not some collective anything that
contrasts with some particular this or that (and thus not a one as opposed
to a many either). The ontological difference again (be-ing {or Being if you
will} is not {a being}). The difference between being(s) and be-ing is not
that of a difference between (collections of) things and other (collections
of) things of any kind, nor the difference between kinds of things and
things (that are of a kind). This difference is different to its self (see
Heraclitus).

> [just as it helps the discussion for you to distinguish ‘be-ing’ from
> ‘being’ typographically as you explain the philosophical difference,
> distinguishing the collective from the particular version of the noun
> helps avoid similar confusions.]

But, see my previous two paragraphs… Be-ing is not {a generalisation, an
abstraction, a commonness, a genus, etc} and thus does not support, e.g.,
the distinction between a collective and the particular that participates in
a collective, etc.

> so, perhaps, to be more precise the question of Being/being could be
> stated as ‘is there Being or a being within the human individual?’.

This shows how very far you are from even uttering the question of be-ing
(in that you firstly make no distinction between be-ing and a being {you use
the stroke/slash in a way suggesting either/or}; and secondly you ask
concerning a “human individual”, a being, and thirdly you ask in terms of
containment {you ask concerning a “within” thus invoking the notion of a
container that ‘has’ its be-ing within its outer self, etc}).

> the question usually doesn’t have to be stated this precisely because
> those who understand it well enough to know that it is not a nonsense
> question — even if they disagree with the answers given by others who
> say they understand the question.
>
> what would prompt you to classify an attempt to ask whether there is an
> immaterial component of the human individual as a nonsense question?

But, Joe, who asked as to some “immaterial component of the human
individual”? Your question “is there be-ing?” for me is nonsense because
be-ing is not {a being} and such a question as to the be-ing of something
must be addressed to a something that is some thing and not something that
is not some thing. If you are asking this other question as to the existence
of some immaterial component of a human individual: for me that is not the
or even a question of be-ing.

> >one can only ask sensibly ‘is there X’ when X is a being (only
> >beings are {because be-ing is not, because be-ing is the be-ing of a
> >being and not a being its self}).
>
> I take it you share Michael E’s formulation: ‘x is’ ‘x is a being’.

Sounds OK, as far as it goes like that.

> I see nothing wrong with such a premise — as a choice; but, there are
> other choices; and, consequently, there is a level of awareness
> logically prior to having accepted this or that root predicate.
>
> ‘x is’ ‘x is not nothing’
>
> ‘not nothing’ = ‘being’

I would rather say: not nothing = a being or some beings (not be-ing) if I
had to put things in the manner of equations.

> ‘x is’ ‘x is a being’
>
> the second of these three steps is where a root predicate is selected
> from among the available options. one could just as easily have chosen
> ‘reality’ or ‘existent’.

But these terms too have sometimes very specific and technical meanings with
different philosophies, and in seemingly liberally employing them (just like
that, making a consumer choice) one is bound up in all sorts of theoretical
nexuses that are not chosen so freely. Reality and existence and actuality
are not equivalent for philosophers and different philosophers use them
differently to others. Let’s stick to be-ing and being(s).

> >And, for the same-ish reason, one needs ask for the be-ing of a
> >predicate (of predication) and not ask as to the predication of be-ing
> >(is be-ing a predicate). It’s not that one can not ask (or should not
> >ask), but asking as to whether be-ing is a predicate (root or
> >otherwise) or not is just (as MichaelE puts it) sophistry, merely
> >multiplying distinctions whilst neatly, cleverly, missing, avoiding the
> >(ontological) difference (qua difference). The very presence of “is” in
> >your question ‘is there Being?’ brings be-ing into play (albeit
> >silently, hiddenly, because unseen as be-ing by logico-linguisticos in
> >the seeming of questioning by asking as to whether be-ing {the ‘is’} is
> >a predicate or copula or whatever) and thus undermines your seeming
> >questioning.
>
> the linguistic sleight of hand that passes for scholarship these days
> begins in this paragraph.
>
> Michael E calls this particular sleight of hand ‘prepredication’ (an ad
> hoc term if I say so myself).
>
> suppose I come along and say (after selecting ‘reality’ as my root
> predicate): ‘x is’ ‘x is a reality’
>
> are you saying that because I used ‘is’ in the sentence ‘x is a reality’
> I *actually said* or *actually meant* ‘x is a being’?

I’m not sure how to answer such a bewildering question where you bring in
“is”, “being”, “reality”& “actually” in a single sentence where you have not
discussed what you mean by any of them whilst glibly using them as if they
were equivalent (ah, but you did distinguish didn’t you, and thus perhaps
you might admit some differences…).

> if that’s what you are saying then you’ve redefined the english language
> (and probably other languages as well) so that no one can even express
> a disagreement with Heidegger.

It’s not a matter of “disagreement” (as if agreement or disagreement
mattered much in philosophical debate), rather I fondly imagine I am trying
to employ the term ‘be-ing’ in a Heideggerian manner (and thus, to some
extent, in a manner not utterly unrecognisable by the entire western
philosophical tradition) — although others here and there might find fault
– and this is a Heidegger list, no? The question of be-ing *is* a question
and not just a vehicle for endless sophistry (because one can); and it is
such a destinal question not to be dissolved (or solved at all as if it were
a problem) in the acid of either scientific/logical/linguistic
(technological) or commonsense reasonings, usages and machinations.

> attempts to redefine the language in which discourse takes place so that
> everyone secretly agrees with you constitute the antithesis of rational
> philosophical inquiry.
>
> such attempts were first depicted in literature. are you familiar with
> George Orwell’s _1984_, a satire of authoritarian political regimes? in
> it state officials attempted to reduce the possibility of rebellion by
> eliminating the possibility of thinking a rebellious thought — by
> rewritting the ‘newspeak’ dictionary to suit themselves.

Uhmmm. But “be-ing” has been at the heart of philosophical discourse for
millennia, and been argued about for millennia. I continue to assume that
you are asking your question of be-ing deliberately on a Heidegger list
whereupon you might be aware that Heidegger formulated just such a
questioning as the very heart of his enterprise? His self-termed
_seinsfrage_ occupied his thinking throughout a long career. In the light of
this, I think it not ridiculous for me to assume that the question you ask
“is there being?” *as* the question of be-ing, be couched within
Heideggerian parameters, no? At least, to start with.

Do you think you can capture this question in the (dis)posing of “reality
types” or “root predicates”?

> I’d like to think of philosophical inquiry as something more than an
> attempt to make life imitate a George Orwell novel.
>
> wouldn’t you?

Yes, and I do not think I am advocating a totalitarian form of discourse
regarding the question of be-ing. But I do think you might take the time to
read Heidegger before/whilst entering into a discussion concerning that very
display par excellence of Heidegger’s distinction, his difference: the
ontological difference (between beings and be-ing). Without such an
ontological difference (for me) Heidegger is nothing (philosophically; yes,
an important thinker anyway, but without that stroke of insight of his that
others had only produced in their very unthought, he is insignificant except
in an obbvious notorious/celebrity manner).

> Joe

regards

michaelP

Posted on Saturday, January 26th, 2008 at 3:45 pm
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