A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent
January 26th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent
michaelP wrote:
>jPolanik wrote:
>>I doubt that what you mean by ‘be-ing’ is the same as what I mean by
>>either ‘Being’ or ‘being’. either one would refer to the ontological
>>(non-physical, metaphenomenal) reality type. ‘Being’ is just the
>>collective version of ‘being’.
>Remember, be-ing {typographically I am distinguishing it from being {=
>a thing, an entity, etc} by the use of the hyphen in order to emphasise
>the verbal rather than the nominal} is not (but the be-ing of what is
>{some thing, etc}, and so it is not (because it is not any thing, not a
>being) a “reality type” and not a “collective version of ‘being’”.
okay, now it is clear that what you mean by ‘be-ing’ is very definitely
not what I mean be either ‘being’ or ‘Being’. I’m glad you cleared that
up; and, perhaps, we can move beyond an endless repetition of the claim
that ‘be-ing’ is not Being or a being.
>>some people prefer to think that there is only one Mind that all
>>humans participate in somehow while others think that there are
>>individual minds, one per person. similarly for Being/being,
>>Self/self, Soul/soul, Spirit/spirit, Existence/existent,
>>Reality/reality and so on. its a common convention to capitalize the
>>collective version of a noun to contrast it with the particular
>>version of the same noun.
>Nope, Joe, be-ing is not and thus is not some collective anything that
>contrasts with some particular this or that (and thus not a one as
>opposed to a many either).
yes, we’ve just established that ‘be-ing’ is not Being or a being.
surely you are aware from your knowledge of philosophical history, that
many people down thru the ages have advocated that there is an
immaterial component to the human individual. there have been many names
for this alleged or hypothesized entity; and, one common theme is that
some people think this entity, the I-3 in first person terminology, is
an individuated entity while others think it is collective and still
others think it is a hybrid, not completely individuated or collective.
>Be-ing is not {a generalisation, an abstraction, a commonness, a
>genus, etc} and thus does not support, e.g., the distinction between a
>collective and the particular that participates in a collective, etc.
of course, I’m not saying that all or any of these are ontological
realities (type 3: immaterial, metaphenomenal); but, surely you would
agree that the language within which philosophical discourse takes place
must allow such positions to be stated.
>>so, perhaps, to be more precise the question of Being/being could be
>>stated as ‘is there Being or a being within the human individual?’.
>you ask concerning a “human individual”, a being
when asking the question of Being/being I don’t want to prejudice the
inquiry by describing the subject of the inquiry as a ‘human being’; so,
I use the phrase ‘human individual’. is there a problem with posing a
question is a way that does not prejudice the search for an answer?
>you use the stroke/slash in a way suggesting either/or
no. I use the slash to Capitalize/uncapitalized construction distinguish
the collective from the individuated version of a noun. the ‘/’ doesn’t
necessary mean they are mutually exclusive since there are hybrid
positions in some cases.
>>what would prompt you to classify an attempt to ask whether there is
>>an immaterial component of the human individual as a nonsense
>>question?
>If you are asking this other question as to the existence of some
>immaterial component of a human individual: for me that is not the or
>even a question of be-ing.
good. then we need not discuss be-ing in this connection again.
clearly, though, ‘Being’ or a ‘being’ is a name that is often given to
the I-3, the alleged or hypothesized immaterial component of the human
individual. consequently, ‘is there Being’ or ‘is there a being’ within
the human individual are legitimate ways of asking whether there is such
a component.
would you not agree? do you consider any attempt to ask whether there is
an immaterial component of the human individual a nonsense question?
Joe
[I know I’ve only responded to about half of your last post, Michael. I
will try to get to the rest of it later this weekend.s]
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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