A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent
January 28th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent
michaelP wrote:
>jPolanik wrote:
>>you share Michael E’s formulation: ‘x is’ ‘x is a being’.
>Sounds OK, as far as it goes like that.
>>I see nothing wrong with such a premise — as a choice; but, there
>>are other choices; and, consequently, there is a level of awareness
>>logically prior to having accepted this or that root predicate.
>>’x is’ ‘x is not nothing’
>>’not nothing’ = ‘being’
>I would rather say: not nothing = a being or some beings (not be-ing)
>if I had to put things in the manner of equations.
>>’x is’ ‘x is a being’
>>the second of these three steps is where a root predicate is selected
>>from among the available options. one could just as easily have chosen
>>’reality’ or ‘existent’.
>But these terms too have sometimes very specific and technical meanings
>with different philosophies, and in seemingly liberally employing them
>(just like that, making a consumer choice) one is bound up in all sorts
>of theoretical nexuses that are not chosen so freely. Reality and
>existence and actuality are not equivalent for philosophers and
>different philosophers use them differently to others. Let’s stick to
>be-ing and being(s).
are ‘be-ing’ and ‘being(s)’ somehow exempt from the concerns you have
about ‘reality’ and ‘existent’? no, of course, not. ‘being’ and cognate
terms have very specific and technical meanings which vary greatly from
philosopher to philosopher.
you say that different philosophers use ‘reality’, ‘existence’ and
‘actuality’ differently; but, ‘being’ is not in this list. are you
suggesting that ‘being’ is used in precisely the same way by every
philosopher that ever was? of course not.
you are right to suggest that, whatever choice is made as to the root
predicate, one is caught up in a network of theoretical connections that
might not all be equally acceptable to a given language user; but, I see
no basis for denying the user that choice.
* * *
BTW, did you notice that Kant, in the passage recently under discussion
concerning the ontological argument, used (to good effect, IMHO) all
three words to make his point? how did he do that — how did he manage
to make any point at all in such a quagmire of ambiguity?
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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