A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent
January 25th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent :: A Being is Not Necessarily an Existent
Joe speaking of Heidegger not asking your question:
> he does not ask ‘is there
> Being?
Joe, it seems to me that your question unasked by Heidegger (but presumably
asked by you) is a nonsense question since be-ing is not a being; one can
only ask sensibly ‘is there X’ when X is a being (only beings are {because
be-ing is not, because be-ing is the be-ing of a being and not a being its
self}). And, for the same-ish reason, one needs ask for the be-ing of a
predicate (of predication) and not ask as to the predication of be-ing (is
be-ing a predicate). It’s not that one can not ask (or should not ask), but
asking as to whether be-ing is a predicate (root or otherwise) or not is
just (as MichaelE puts it) sophistry, merely multiplying distinctions whilst
neatly, cleverly, missing, avoiding the (ontological) difference (qua
difference). The very presence of “is” in your question ‘is there Being?’
brings be-ing into play (albeit silently, hiddenly, because unseen as be-ing
by logico-linguisticos in the seeming of questioning by asking as to whether
be-ing {the ‘is’} is a predicate or copula or whatever) and thus undermines
your seeming questioning.
regards
michaelP