Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> >>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >>>1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>>2. Therefore, if I know that I exist, I must know that there is
> >>>something which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
> >>>throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
>
> NB: in order to refer to the statements of your argument by the numbers
> you give them and to the points of this critique by the numbers I give
> them, I’ll refer to the former as {#} and the latter as [#].

Thank you for finally addressing the argument.

> [1]: you have no defined ‘exist’ as used in {2} and {4}. is it used as a
> substitue for ‘am’ which only asserts ‘not nothing’; or, is it used in
> some other sense?

“not nothing” is fine.

> [2]: {2} is stated as if it were a conclusion; but, it is your primary
> assumption; and, it is an argumentative one at that; so, it must be
> unpacked.

Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e., that I
remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying that would
be denying an identical referent for the identical first person pronoun
that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was born, I am
now X, I will die). So step two concludes that knowing my existence
implies knowing that there is some identity throughout everything about
me that changes.

> [3]: in {2} there are three uses of ‘I’. do they have the same referent;
> and, if so, what is the reality type of the referent of ‘I’; or, if not,
> what is the reality type of the referent of ‘I’ in each use? there is
> also one use of ‘my’, the first person pronoun inflected for the
> possessive case. is the referent of ‘my’ the same as the referent of one
> or more of the referents of ‘I’; and, if so, what is its reality type?

Yes, the referent for both “I” and “my” is assumed to be the same. As
which reality type, the argument works whether it is phenomenal or
metaphenomenal. If it’s phenomenal, then there is no evidence that there
is any phenomenon that remains identical throughout my whole life. If
it’s metaphenomenal, there is similarly no evidence that there is any
metaphenomenon that remains identical throughout my whole life.

> [4]: a version claim {2} was presented by Hume; and, using the more
> precise set of pronouns available in ALPI (Axiomatic Language for
> Psychophilosophical Inquiry), it is clear that Hume’s statement should
> be translated thus: if I-2 knowing that I-3 am, I-2 must know that there
> is something of reality type 3 which remains identical throughout all
> the perceptions I-2 have of it. if, on the contrary, you are claiming
> that each use of ‘I’ in {2} has the same referent it would have to be
> the I-2; and, you have not shown how it is possible for you to say, “I-2
> know that it is not the case I-2 that I-2 am”.

First, the argument above isn’t that I know it is not the case that I
am. The argument is that I don’t know that I am (i.e., a skeptical
conclusion about knowing that I exist). You have made this same
misrepresentation several times now. Please get it right next time.
Secondly, Hume’s argues that there is no evidence for EITHER my
phenomenal or metaphenomenal identity. So his argument isn’t limited to
your I-3.

> (query: how could you
> possibly end up proving a statement like ‘I-2 am fundamentally them’
> without proving ‘I-2 am’ and adding some evidence/argument to provide a
> basis for a conclusion as to what I-2 am? (of course, you may substitute
> some other subscripted pronoun if you are claiming Heidegger has proven
> something else))

We’ll get to Heidegger later.

> [5]: there is in {2} an ambiguity as to the meaning of ‘know’. do you
> limit it to knowing by logical deduction, as when one says ‘we know that
> the pythagorean theorem is provable in euclidean geometry’.

I am limiting it to evidence based logical deduction.

> [6]: is sometimes said that Hume was attempting to imitate the
> methods of natural scientists. if so and if you are imitating Hume, then
> you are proceeding as follows:
>
> * I-2 hypothesize that there is an I-3;
>
> * I-2 hypothesize that I-2 may know that there is an I-3 by means of
> a rational argument and a phenomenological experiment.
>
> * I-2 hypothesize that I-2 may directly detect the I-3 by perceiving
> it.

Misrepresentation #1. Scientific procedure is not limited to argument by
direct perception. Most scientific conclusions (e.g., about stars or
atoms or dinosaurs) are deduced from the perception of something else,
through a series of argumentative steps. All I said was “evidence,”
which can mean either direct perception or deduction from direct
perception of something else.

> * I-2 hpothesize that the I-3 remains self-identical (unchanged) over
> time.
>
> * I-2 hpothesize that I-2 am able to observe something unchanging
> within my perceptions; and, that this unchanging thing is the I-3.

Misrepresentation #2. The argument is not limited to direct observation
of something unchanging within perceptions, but also includes proposed
deductions of something unchanging.

> * I report having conducted a phenomenological experiment in which I-2
> have examined my perceptions; and, I report not having perceived
> anything unchanging.

Misrepresentation #3. The report is not limited to “not having perceived
anything unchanging,” but includes proposed deductions from changing
perceptions.

> * I conclude that there is no I-3 of any sort (instead of the more
> circumspect conclusion that, if there is an I-3, the hypothesized
> property can not be detected by the means employed in this
> experiment).

Misrepresentation #4. The conclusion isn’t that “there is no I-3,” but
that I cannot know there is any I-3.

> these points will suffice for now. they are certainly sufficient to
> justify concluding that your argument is flawed.

Considering four significant back-to-back misrepresentations of the
argument, you have a strange definition of “certainly”.

> >>if I were considering this argument, I would likely conclude my
> >>contemplation with the remark, “… and, yet, I know that I am”.
>
> >In which case, you would be saying, I can make assertions with no
> >evidence and still consider myself a philosopher.
>
> not so. as indicated previously, I base by assertion on the experience
> of reflective self-awareness together with the self-evidently true (or
> intuitively obvious) proposition: nothing unreal is self-aware.

Then please describe this “experience” (your word) of reflective
self-awareness to which you refer, and precisely what in that experience
indicates an identity within your changing perceptions.

Posted on Saturday, March 22nd, 2008 at 1:25 pm
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