A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument
March 24th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument
Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>>Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e., that
>>>I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying that
>>>would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
>>>pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
>>>born, I am now X, I will die).
>>I-2 reject the first and third of the examples you give. I-2 know that
>>I-1 was born and that I-1 will die;
>I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes’ arguments in the First
>Meditation, how again do we “know” that there are any physical bodies
>at all?
given?
you’ve previously admitted that Heidegger does not accept Descartes’
arguments; so, what would make you think I should accept those arguments
as ‘given’?
perhaps it *is* time to move on. let’s just assume that you and I are
both standing in the world defined by Heidegger’s first usage of ‘world’
— it seems virtually identical to the notion of a physical universe
existing as a metaphenomenal reality independent of the experience I-2
have of it.
how do you justify the claim that I can not ask ‘what am I?’ while
standing in this world?
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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