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March 24th, 2008, search related
Related posts :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument :: A Critique of the Hume/Crifasi Argument

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >>>Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e., that
> >>>I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying that
> >>>would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
> >>>pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
> >>>born, I am now X, I will die).
>
> >>I-2 reject the first and third of the examples you give. I-2 know that
> >>I-1 was born and that I-1 will die;
>
> >I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes’ arguments in the First
> >Meditation, how again do we “know” that there are any physical bodies
> >at all?
>
> given?
>
> you’ve previously admitted that Heidegger does not accept Descartes’
> arguments; so, what would make you think I should accept those arguments
> as ‘given’?

because we’re not talking about Heidegger right now, Joe. We’re talking
about whether beginning with me as an individual leads to skepticism.
I’ve said that numerous times now, Joe. You are clearly either unable to
follow an argument, or are attempting rhetorical maneuvers in order to
avoid addressing the arguments in Descartes’ First Meditation. Which is it?

> perhaps it *is* time to move on. let’s just assume that you and I are
> both standing in the world defined by Heidegger’s first usage of ‘world’
> — it seems virtually identical to the notion of a physical universe
> existing as a metaphenomenal reality independent of the experience I-2
> have of it.
>
> how do you justify the claim that I can not ask ‘what am I?’ while
> standing in this world?

You can ask it. You’ll just end up with a skeptical conclusion about
your existence. Just like I argued in my last post (Hume), which you’ve
decided not to address in this post.

Since you have yet again fashioned your reply in a manner which does not
address my previous arguments concerning it, this conversation has
ceased being worth our time. Should your next reply actually address
either (1) the skeptical arguments that Descartes gives in his First
Meditation, or (2) the comments I made about Hume in my last post, then
I will reply. Otherwise, this conversation is over.

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