Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> >>how do you justify the claim that I can not ask ‘what am I?’ while
> >>standing in this world?
>
> >You can ask it. You’ll just end up with a skeptical conclusion about
> >your existence.
>
> how could this possibly happen? you have undertaken to prove all that I
> have undertaken to prove — and more.
>
> I’m saying, “I-2 know that I-2 am; but, not what I-2 am”. specifically,
> I-2 saying that I-2 do not know my own origin. you, on the other hand,
> are claiming to know (to have evidence-based deductive proof) that “I-2
> am really them”.
>
> so, I’m skeptical of your claim that you have proof that ‘I am them’. if
> you’ve got such a case, present it.

I have told you - repeatedly - that the first step in my argument is the
reduction of traditional analyses of self (i.e., ones beginning with me
as an individual) to skepticism. Yet you continue your rhetorical
tapdancing and maneuvering by attacking the conclusion without
addressing the premises. And you now do this yet again, when you have
clearly demonstrated in the past that you do not have the necessary
knowledge of Heidegger’s philosophy to undertake that later stage of the
argument yet.

I predict that you will once again not address this point and still ask
for a proof that “I am them” without addressing the preliminary
skeptical issues. (prediction #1)

> >Just like I argued in my last post (Hume), which you’ve
> >decided not to address in this post.
>
> >Since you have yet again fashioned your reply in a manner which does
> >not address my previous arguments concerning it, this conversation has
> >ceased being worth our time. Should your next reply actually address
> >either (1) the skeptical arguments that Descartes gives in his First
> >Meditation, or (2) the comments I made about Hume in my last post, then
> >I will reply. Otherwise, this conversation is over.
>
> why would I pick door #1? you’ve already conceeded that we can both
> stand in the physical world (what I call existential reality and what
> Heidegger calls world (usage 1)); so, that takes care of any first
> meditation concerns that you have exempted Heidegger from addressing.

and yet again, you demonstrate a complete misunderstanding of what
Heidegger means by “world” as the kind that Descartes is denying. I have
repeatedly pointed out that my argument for the Heideggerian manner of
being in the world is the reduction of YOUR meaning of being in the
world (as a physical thing in the universe) to skepticism, through
Descartes’ arguments in the First Meditation. If the First Meditation is
right, then you cannot know that there is any I-1 or I-3.

I predict that you will once again ignore this point and bring in the
same misreading of Heidegger. (prediction #2)

> why would I pick door #2? you’ve already shown me its empty. your
> recurring complaints that I’ve misrepresented your skeptical conclusion
> are a smokescreen. as long as you are postulating the I-2 drawing a
> conclusion (skeptical or otherwise) about itself, my reply is the same:
> nothing unreal can draw a conclusion about itself. it doesn’t matter if
> the conclusion is right or wrong. nothing unreal can draw any conclusion
> (correct or incorrect) about itself.

You completely ignore the explicit reply I gave to this two posts ago:
“Yet another example of a glib reply that ignores Hume’s critiques of
the notions of “reality” and “unreality.” If the “reality” here is not
phenomenal, then yet again you have failed to provide any evidence for
any such “reality.” But if the “reality” here is phenomenal, then you
have still failed to provide any evidence of any identity within
phenomenal “reality”. So either way, your reply is completely without
evidence.”

I predict that you will once again ignore this argument. (prediction #3)

> I have no other comment on the Hume/Crifasi argument until you repair it
> in the following ways:
>
> 1. you present some evidence or argument to demonstrate that premise 1
> (I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions) is true and is a
> necessary condition of My existence (not nothingness) as you claim. your
> whole argument is bogus if there is no support for its first premise

The following was the thread in the past few posts dealing with that
very issue:

>> >>>>>1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>> >>>>>2. Therefore, if I know that I exist, I must know that there is
>> >>>>>something which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>> >>>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
>> >>>>>throughout all my perceptions.
>> >>>>>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
>>
>> >Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e., that
>> >I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying that
>> >would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
>> >pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
>> >born, I am now X, I will die).
>>
>> I-2 reject the first and third of the examples you give. I-2 know that
>> I-1 was born and that I-1 will die;
>
> I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes’ arguments in the First Meditation, how again do we “know” that there are any physical bodies at all? It’s astounding that at this point, after I’ve cited Descartes’ First Meditation numerous times now, you just glibly bring in I-1 without addressing his arguments there.

In your last post, you did not address that last reply from me above.
And now you act as if I had never addressed your objection (above) to
the “self-identity” issue. You have therefore yet again fashioned your
reply in a manner that ignores my previous replies.

I had intended to give this discussion another chance. But you have now
demonstrated that you have absolutely no intention actually addressing
my points. This conversation is now permanently ended.

>
> 2. you address the point noted above: that any conclusion the I-2 draws
> about itself (skeptical or otherwise) demonstrates its reality via some
> variant of the first law of reality: nothing unreal is self-aware.
>
> 3. you support your attempt to define a ‘moment’ as having no actual
> duration. neuroscientists treat the present moment or ‘now’ as having a
> variable (but measureable duration); so, if you have to use an
> idiosyncratic definition of moment to conclude an argument containing
> the first two weaknesses, you’ll need to explain away the science.
>
> * * *
>
> now, here we are standing in the same physical world. here we are
> experiencing this and that experience. here you are claiming you can
> prove ‘I am really them’.
>
> I’m calling your bluff.
>
> state your case or fold up your tent.

I predict that you will once again similarly cast yourself as the one
who hasn’t been ignoring the arguments I’ve been giving.

Posted on Tuesday, March 25th, 2008 at 1:55 pm
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