Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>>>1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.

>>>2. Therefore, if I know that I exist, I must know that there is
>>>something which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.

>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
>>>throughout all my perceptions.

>>>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.

>>as predicted, neither you nor Hume conclude your analysis with the
>>words, “… and, thus, it is not the case that I am”.

>>do you have any concluding remark as to the impact of this argument on
>>your philosophical inquiry, on your quest for greater understanding?

>>do you conclude, “… and, thus, I know that I am not”?

>>do you, for example, conclude, “… and, therefore, I may reasonably
>>assume … [whatever]”?

>The first “S” in what you have been calling “SIS” stands for
>skepticism. The argument above demonstrates a skeptical conclusion
>regarding my existence. Therefore, I’ve shown what I said I would show,
>and what you disputed could be shown.

yes, the first ‘S’ stands for skepticism; and, I am skeptical of your
claim that your argument demonstrates a skeptical conclusion regarding
the existence of the referent of ‘I’ that asserts ‘I am’. it seems to me
that all you have attempted to demonstrate is a skeptical conclusion
regarding one’s ability to prove by rational argumentation the existence
of the referent of ‘I’ that asserts ‘I am’.

that is why I asked if you would state the impact of the argument on
your philosophical views; for example, do you conclude “… and, thus,
it is not the case that I am” or do you draw some other such conclusion?
until you do state a conclusion of that sort, all I’m able to do is
critique your argument as to its form and completeness; and, my critique
includes (but is not limited to) the following points:

NB: in order to refer to the statements of your argument by the numbers
you give them and to the points of this critique by the numbers I give
them, I’ll refer to the former as {#} and the latter as [#].

[1]: you have no defined ‘exist’ as used in {2} and {4}. is it used as a
substitue for ‘am’ which only asserts ‘not nothing’; or, is it used in
some other sense?

[2]: {2} is stated as if it were a conclusion; but, it is your primary
assumption; and, it is an argumentative one at that; so, it must be
unpacked.

[3]: in {2} there are three uses of ‘I’. do they have the same referent;
and, if so, what is the reality type of the referent of ‘I’; or, if not,
what is the reality type of the referent of ‘I’ in each use? there is
also one use of ‘my’, the first person pronoun inflected for the
possessive case. is the referent of ‘my’ the same as the referent of one
or more of the referents of ‘I’; and, if so, what is its reality type?

[4]: a version claim {2} was presented by Hume; and, using the more
precise set of pronouns available in ALPI (Axiomatic Language for
Psychophilosophical Inquiry), it is clear that Hume’s statement should
be translated thus: if I-2 knowing that I-3 am, I-2 must know that there
is something of reality type 3 which remains identical throughout all
the perceptions I-2 have of it. if, on the contrary, you are claiming
that each use of ‘I’ in {2} has the same referent it would have to be
the I-2; and, you have not shown how it is possible for you to say, “I-2
know that it is not the case I-2 that I-2 am”. (query: how could you
possibly end up proving a statement like ‘I-2 am fundamentally them’
without proving ‘I-2 am’ and adding some evidence/argument to provide a
basis for a conclusion as to what I-2 am? (of course, you may substitute
some other subscripted pronoun if you are claiming Heidegger has proven
something else))

[5]: there is in {2} an ambiguity as to the meaning of ‘know’. do you
limit it to knowing by logical deduction, as when one says ‘we know that
the pythagorean theorem is provable in euclidean geometry’.

[6]: is sometimes said that Hume was attempting to imitate the
methods of natural scientists. if so and if you are imitating Hume, then
you are proceeding as follows:

* I-2 hypothesize that there is an I-3;

* I-2 hypothesize that I-2 may know that there is an I-3 by means of
a rational argument and a phenomenological experiment.

* I-2 hypothesize that I-2 may directly detect the I-3 by perceiving
it.

* I-2 hpothesize that the I-3 remains self-identical (unchanged) over
time.

* I-2 hpothesize that I-2 am able to observe something unchanging
within my perceptions; and, that this unchanging thing is the I-3.

* I report having conducted a phenomenological experiment in which I-2
have examined my perceptions; and, I report not having perceived
anything unchanging.

* I conclude that there is no I-3 of any sort (instead of the more
circumspect conclusion that, if there is an I-3, the hypothesized
property can not be detected by the means employed in this
experiment).

these points will suffice for now. they are certainly sufficient to
justify concluding that your argument is flawed.

>>if I were considering this argument, I would likely conclude my
>>contemplation with the remark, “… and, yet, I know that I am”.

>In which case, you would be saying, I can make assertions with no
>evidence and still consider myself a philosopher.

not so. as indicated previously, I base by assertion on the experience
of reflective self-awareness together with the self-evidently true (or
intuitively obvious) proposition: nothing unreal is self-aware.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Saturday, March 22nd, 2008 at 11:05 am
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