Heidegger

Self-Identity Over Time — A Necessary Condition Of Existence?

Anthony,

one of your crucial claims seems to be that the proposition ‘I remain
self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
of existence.

this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:

[1]: P -> Q

where

P = ‘I exist’
Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’

you also claim that Q is false.

[2]: -Q

yes, I know that we have a dispute about whether you’ve assumed or
concluded propositions [1] and [2]; but, for now, the point is simply
that your argument against A1 {it is not possible to attribute
predicates to nothing} depends on both propositions [1] and [2] being
true.

are you willing to acknowledge this much: that the truth of a conclusion
reached via modus tollens depends on the truth of the assumptions made
in the derivation of that conclusion?

==============================================================
The Structure of the Argument
==============================================================

let’s take a look at the structure of your argument that P -> Q is true.
there are a number of problems that remain despite the fact that you’ve
not dealt with them.

———————————————–
Problem 1: Contrary to Heidegger
———————————————–

from my post of 2008-04-16:

>toward the end of his career, Heidegger makes a startling admission. in
>discussion Descartes, Heidegger writes: “The formula which the
>proposition sometimes has, ‘Cogito ergo sum’, suggests the
>misunderstanding that it is here a question of inference. … The sum
>is not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is the ground
>of thinking, the fundamentum.” [1]

>this is, of course, all that Descartes needs to prove ‘I experience;
>therefore, I am’.

>Heidegger is using ‘being’ as his root predicate (ie to carry the
>meaning ‘not nothing’) while we have been using ‘exists’ or
>’existence’; so, we must translate back and forth.

>once we notice experiencing anything at all, we deduce that the logical
>preconditions of experiencing have been satisfied; and, thus, we can
>say either: ‘I experience; therefore, I am’ or ‘given that I
>experience; it is necessarily true that I am’.

How do you explain how your proposition [1] can be made to appear
consistent with the passage I quoted from Heidegger?

———————————————–
Problem 2: Existing and Perceiving
———————————————–

it seems to me that Heidegger and Descartes share what might be
considered a tradtional belief that existence is a necessary (but not a
sufficient) condition of perceiving. a stone exists but does not
perceive. for you to claim the reverse, that perceiving is a necessary
condition of existing, you would have to show either that stones
perceive or that stones do not exist.

how do you do that?

———————————————–
Problem 3: Plausible Deniability
———————————————–

you argument for [1] seems to be that Q is undeniable.

according to you “Denying that [Q] would be denying an identical
referent for the identical first person pronoun that I use to refer to
myself at any point in my life (I was born, I am now X, I will die).”

of course, in your next breath you do in fact assert -Q; so, your
proposition [2] itself denies what you claim is undeniable.

but, apparently, you expect other people to overlook this gaping
contradiction.

———————————————–
3.1: Pronouns and Referents
———————————————–

[JP, 2008-03-23]: “you have correctly identified the major consequence
of denying [Q: I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions].
the referent of a first person pronoun used at time t1 is not
necessarily identical to the referent of the same first person pronoun
used at time t2. however, you have failed to explain why this is a
problem.”

your posts since then support a reconstruction of your argument as
follows:

* it is a fact that, in english, the first-person singular pronoun is
now and has for centuries been spelled ‘I’.

* it is a fact that a given person uses ‘I’ for self-referencing at
various points in time.

* these two facts must have an explanation.

* the only possible explanation is Q, that that the referent of ‘I’ is
always self-identical.

* but, at [2], -Q is assumed/concluded: the referent of ‘I’ is never
self-identical.

* therefore … what? that your claim to have found the only possible
explanation for the unchanged spelling of the english first-person
singular pronoun is false?

———————————————–
3.2 Evidence from the Counseling Profession
———————————————–

we have to distinguish two issues because I raised one objection and you
gave an irrelevant reply

———————————————–
3.2.1: Change Happens
———————————————–

I gave you my reason for doubting that the proposition in question is
self-evidently true: the counseling profession is devoted to breaking
this assumed self-identity over time. often, a counselee is helped to
understand that “I am not the person I once was” or “I can change”.

>>given that people grow and develop physically, emotionally and
>>mentally, how do you know that the referent of ‘I’ remains
>>self-identical over time? why would there be a problem if it did not?

instead of responding to the fact that change happens, you started to
use psychiatric symptomatology to justify your philosophical claims.

———————————————–
3.2.2: Psychiatric Evidence
———————————————–

>the relevant cases from the “counseling profession,” are the ones in
>which people stop referring to themselves in the past by the first
>person pronoun. Those in the “counseling profession” consider that to
>be a sign of a complete break in self-identity (e.g., schizophrenia, in
>which the different “selves” refer to each other in the 3rd person).
>Hence, those in the “counseling profession” agree with me that the
>identity of the first person pronoun is necessarily tied to
>self-identity.

Objections to your latest attempt to distract attention from the gaping
contradictions already noted above:

* you have confused schizophrenia with multiple personality disorder.
with MPD, each personality will refer to itself in the first person and
to the others in the third person. with schizophrenia there is often a
loss of the first person perspective in favor of a third person
perspective.

* in any event, … so what? some psychiatric disorders have symptoms
including disturbed self-reference; and, therefore, … what?

are you saying that Q is a necessary condition of existence (even though
you assume Q is false); because, some psychiatric patients have
disturances of self-reference?

how does any of this ‘evidence’ from the psychiatric ward prove that
proposition Q, ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’,
is a necessary condition of existence even though you have proven to
your own satisfaction that Q is false?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, May 4th, 2008 at 6:00 am
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