a note on philosophy and rhetoric, addendum
June 8th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: a note on philosophy and rhetoric :: a note on philosophy and rhetoric :: a note on philosophy and rhetoric :: a note on philosophy and rhetoric
Quoting allen scult :
>> allen scult wrote: >> >>> Pardon for the unwarranted intrusion. The following occurred in the >>> course of my own researches and I thought some on the list might find >>> it interesting. >>> >> > In “Plato’s Sophist,” Heidegger says, >>> >>> “Thus it happens that this dialogue manifests a peculiar >>> intertwining. Precisely on the path of a reflection on the Being of >>> beings, Plato attains the correct ground for interpreting the sophist >> > in his Being.” >>> >>> The problem at issue here is how can philosophy obtain, get to, the >>> true ground of its being. >> >> the problem as stated begs the question of whether philosophy ‘itself’ >> has its own ground or whether a philosopher as presented just stands on >> the ground of the presenting philosopher. any attempt to see philosophy >> as a disguised autobiography would incline to the latter view. > > Nice point Joseph. > > I would say for both Heidegger and myself(!@#), philosophy itself is > a “basic movement of factical life.” So as a phenomenologist, it’s > the MOVEMENT I’m following irrespective of the precise nature of the > content. The way of philosophy follows the sign(s) of the formale > Anzeige both to and fro. Such indications are all we have regarding > the Being of beings no matter who we are, but the philosopher > qualifies himself as a reader of such signs, especially the sign that > he is (”I am a sign that is unread.”). > > Regards, > > Allen
To be a bit more speciic about the peculiar qualifications of philosophy, H. makes it clear, that philosophy is part and parcel of the Greek Dasein. In the beginning, Greek philosophy brought together in their way of being, that is in their way of being-toward, philosopher and philosophy. This way of being-toward is embodied in the discourse of Plato’s Dialogues and shows itself in Aristotle as a conceptual analysis of “truth as a property of knowledge.”
Aristotle’s term for the “how” of truth as a property of knowledge, that is, how said truth shows itself, is Krisis, the “objective,” the “object-toward-which” rhetoric is directed . . .which leads us to the hanging chad of rhetoric at the end of the Gorgias—that is, there might very well be an ideal rhetoric, but it has no practitioners. However, and mark me well, if we find a true phronimos, he will recognize the sophist in himself and speak with appropriate respect for the doings of language in his saying—that is he will dwell in the poetic. So you know where to find him. But if you do find him on road, kill him.
Zarathustra (A.S. signing in for “Thus Spake. . .”)
