Heidegger

—– Original Message —–
From: “allen scult”

> Anthony,
>
> Thanks for the concordant help. This mode of exegesis, interpreting the
> meaning of a somewhat obscure or ambiguous occurrence of a word or
> expression, in the light of other places in the text where the word or
> expression is used, is central in Biblical interpretation. The other texts
> where it is used ( Shakespeare, Joyce) presume a logos-like quality to
> the words–that is, each usage of each word is somehow perfectly right
> what the word means in that context and is perfectly consistent with every
> other usage of the word. This is possible because the entire text comes
> to us from a single source of meaning, one which, we assume, knows what
> it’s doing. I should mention, in passing, that the man responsible for
> the biblical concordance, having to do everything by hand, was named
> Mandelkorn (The traditional biblical concordance is called simply,
> “MandelKorn”), and after completing the work, was nuts for the rest of
> his life. So be careful.

The modern cure: electronic search and indices.

>>Heidegger’s “deficient modes” are meant to reply to a pattern of
>>objections. In each of the above cases, Heidegger is proposing an
>>existential characteristic of Dasein. But if a situation could be found in
>>which Dasein *lacks* the proposed existential characteristic, then
>>Heidegger’s proposal cannot be correct (since Dasein can never be without
>>its existential characteristics). So each of the above cases, Heidegger is
>>anticipating that objection, and replying to it by exhibiting the supposed
>>*lack* of the existential characteristic as actually a deficient mode of
>>it, which therefore presupposes it in the first place.
>
> I’m sure I’m missing something, but on this interpretation, isn’t
> Heidegger’s assertion that x is a deficient form of why, merely
> circular-definitional? Or perhaps it’s phenomenological in the sense
> that the assertion follows as from a formal indication. In that case,
> I’m left thinking about the relationship between Being-with and being
> alone in the appropriate way, including the appropriate ambiguity, as, I
> think, did Michael, as well.

If one doesn’t notice that what Heidegger is doing above is anticipating a
possible problem, then Heidegger’s statement that x is a deficient form of
why will look like just a pure assertion, and therefore merely
circular-definitional. But if he is trying to head off the objection that
there can be times when Dasein seems to lack his proposed existential
characteristics, then all he is doing is showing how the supposed lack *can*
be explained under his proposal after all (i.e., as a deficiency, not a
lack).

An analogy: Aristotle argues in Physics II.8 that physis acts towards a
telos. In one of his arguments, he anticipates the objection that if that
were true, then abnormal individuals would never be produced in nature
(i.e., Darwin’s random mutations, and Aristotle’s natural “mistakes”).
Aristotle responds that this does not prove a lack of telos, since such
examples can be explained as “failures” (i.e., deficiencies) in the
purposive effort. Now if what Aristotle says is not seen as a response to a
possible objection, then his statement that such examples are actually just
deficiencies looks like a pure assertion - circular definitional. But since
he is responding to an objection, all he is doing is showing how the
proposed “lack” (of a telos) *can* be explained in his terms (a purposive
aim) after all, thereby removing the objection.

Posted on Sunday, June 11th, 2006 at 2:05 am
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