Heidegger

—– Original Message —–
From: “allen scult”

> I’m wanting to better understand what Heidegger means when he says that
> being alone is a deficient form of being with. The other place where he
> uses such an expression (there might be others still) is when he says that
> assertion is a deficient form of interpretation.

Here is every place I could find in SuZ where Heidegger uses that
expression:

If historiology is wanting, this is not evidence against Dasein’s
historicality; on the contrary, as a deficient mode of this state of Being,
it is evidence for it. Only because it is historical can an era be
unhistoriological. (SuZ 20)

Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest - these too are ways
of concern; but these are all deficient modes, in which the possibilities of
concern are kept to a bare minimum. (57)

If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the
present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in
our having-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern holds back from
any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what
is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying
alongside. (61)

The region itself becomes visible in a conspicuous manner only when one
discovers the ready-to-hand circumspectively and does so in the deficient
modes of concern. (104)

Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically
no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being-alone is
Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a
Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very
possibility is proof of this. (120)

For example, ‘welfare work’, as a factical social arrangement, is grounded
in Dasein’s state of Being as Being-with. Its factical urgency gets its
motivation in that Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part
in the deficient modes of solicitude. Being for, against, or without one
another, passing one another by, not mattering to one another - these are
possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient
and indifferent modes that characterize everyday, average
Being-with-one-another. (121)

Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is
ready-to-hand, solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance. Like
solicitude, these can range through their respective deficient and
indifferent modes up to the point of inconsiderateness or the
perfunctoriness for which indifference leads the way. (123)

But because solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the
deficient or at least the indifferent modes (in the indifference of passing
one another by), the kind of knowing-oneself which is essential and closest,
demands that one become acquainted with oneself. (125)

In understanding, one’s own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in such a
way that one’s Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of. It
knows this, however, not by having discovered some fact, but by maintaining
itself in an existentiell possibility. The kind of ignorance which
corresponds to this, does not consist in an absence or cessation of
understanding, but must be regarded as a deficient mode of the projectedness
of one’s potentiality-for-Being. (336)

The affirmation that something is not present-at-hand is founded upon our
missing it; and both our missing it and our affirmation have their own
existential presuppositions. Such missing is by no means a
not-making-present; it is rather a deficient mode of the Present in the
sense of the making-unpresent of something which one has expected or which
one has always had at one’s disposal. (355)

> It seems obvious that there he means “a lesser form,” that is,
> hermeneutically less adequate.
>
> Every factical enactment of a hermeneutical possibility may be more or
> less authentic. It seems that in order to be so, every authentic step in
> understanding must have its pseudos: It looks like the path, but it
> isn’t. I know many examples of this, most of them for some reason are in
> the realm of religion.
>
> Well, the confusing conclusion I come to here is that being alone and
> being with are each pseudos of the other.

It’s more than that - Heidegger’s “deficient modes” are meant to reply to a
pattern of objections. In each of the above cases, Heidegger is proposing an
existential characteristic of Dasein. But if a situation could be found in
which Dasein *lacks* the proposed existential characteristic, then
Heidegger’s proposal cannot be correct (since Dasein can never be without
its existential characteristics). So each of the above cases, Heidegger is
anticipating that objection, and replying to it by exhibiting the supposed
*lack* of the existential characteristic as actually a deficient mode of it,
which therefore presupposes it in the first place.

1. For example, how can Dasein be fundamentally historical if Dasein can
lack historiology? Because unhistoriological Dasein is simply a deficient
mode of historicality.
2. How can Dasein be fundamentally concernful if Dasein can leave things
undone, neglect, renounce, take a rest? Because these are simply deficient
modes of concernfulness.
3. How can Dasein be fundamentally concernful if, in *knowing* something, it
holds back from manipulating etc? Because this holding back, which is
knowing, is actually a deficient mode of concernfulness in the first place.
4. How can Dasein be fundamentally with-Others if the Other can be missing,
or Dasein can be-alone? Because these are deficient modes of Being-with,
since the Other can be *missing* only for a Being-with.
5. How can solicitude fundamentally characterize Dasein if Dasein can
being-against or without one another, pass one another by, or not matter to
one another? Because these are deficient modes of solicitude.
6. How can Dasein fundamentally be in understanding of its own
potentiality-for-Being if we can be ignorant of that fact? Because this kind
of ignorance is simply a deficient mode of the understanding that is the
projectedness of one’s potentiality-for-Being.
7. How can making-Present fundamentally characterize Dasein if Dasein can
not-make-Present by missing something which is not present? Because such
missing is a deficient mode of making-present of that which one expected or
which always had at one’s disposal.

It is essential that Heidegger anticipate and answer these objections, since
Dasein cannot possibly be without its existential characteristics, so any
such lack would be a fundamental philosphical challenge to Heidegger’s
entire project.

Posted on Saturday, June 10th, 2006 at 2:25 pm
comment | rss 2.0 | trackback