A Search Focusing Question?
January 30th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: :: Horton hears a somewho (noob question) :: Is it merely Trivially True? :: List Archive
michaelP wrote:
>The words don’t matter at all with be-ing (”be-ing” is barely a word at
>all since it be-comes a being the minute it is articulated; thus,
>be-ing is covered by the word “be-ing”, which is why Heidegger at one
>time felt compelled to cross it out; I attempt to show that “be-ing” is
>not the name of any thing by emphasisiing its verbal/processing meaning
>rather than the nominal through the limited use of the hyphen; but
>’really’ it ought to erase its self even as it is being
>articulated/sounded/written).
treating ‘be-ing’ as a verb gives you a certain orientation or
standpoint from which recapitulate the deconstruction of ontology.
treating ‘Being/being’ as a noun would provide a different standpoint.
perhaps one would need to deconstruct ontology from each standpoint in
order to deconstruct those standpoints as well. in any event, we are a
couple of steps logically prior to the point at which, due preparations
having been made, we can embark upon such a recapitulation of the
deconstruction of ontology.
Michael, do you sincerely expect anyone to believe you when you say
“words don’t matter at all with be-ing”?
if you are sincere, why is there such opposition to my claim that the
act of choosing a root predicate is logically prior to the condition of
having a root predicate — whether that root predicate is ‘being’ (or
‘be-ing’) or ‘reality’ or ‘existent’ or whatever?
>your question “is there be-ing?” qua “is there is an immaterial
>component of the human individual?” is about the material/non-material
>structure of a particular being (however interesting and peculiar) and
>is thereby not a question concerning be-ing as such
there is no ‘question’ and no ‘answer’ concerning ‘be-ing as such’.
there is only a choice from among root predicates. having chosen a root
predicate, one realizes that not all that is is in the same way and one
that one must either construct a taxonomy of [root predicate]-types or
uncover the taxonomy one is already using. {1}
it would seem relatively easy for the experiencer to classify itself as
a phenomenological reality (or, schematically, as a [root predicate] of
type 2 - phenomenological).
it would also seem relatively easy for the I-2 to classify its human
body as an existential reality (or, schematically, as a [root predicate]
of type 1 - existential; an existent).
the difficult question, the one which provokes controversy, is whether
there is an I-3, a component of the human individual that is an
ontological reality (or, schematically, as a [root predicate]
of type 3 - ontological; Being or a being ).
what am I?
is that not a legitimate question one might ask?
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
