Heidegger

Axis of Error: AIT and Heideggerianism Share a Place

Principle of Locative Determination

Joe: it is this principle of locative determination that supports the
Heideggerian assumption that the copula asserts locative information and
thus assists in the defining of its unit of analysis, the instance of
‘being-here’ that each human is said to be.

Jud: AIT analysis is diametrically opposed to the Heideggerian position.
The Heideggerian *Being-Here* or *Being-There* has nothing at all to do
with locative information. It is used in the sense of the existential
sense of being present in the world and occurring in the world and being
with others in that world. THAT IS WHY PEOPLE SOMETIMES REFER TO IT AS A
FORM OF EXISTENTIALISM!

AIT and Heideggerianism share many points of similarity.

neither AIT nor Heideggerianism understand that ‘existent’, reality and
‘being’ are *alternate* root predicates

neither viewpoint understands that the choice of root predicate is
*relative* to the linguistic frame of reference in which it functions as
such.

thus, both AIT and Heideggerianism *share* the assumption of a preferred
place for their own chosen root predicate. humanese, in contrast, denies
that any of these linguistic frame of references has a preferred place.

Heideggerianism is ahead of AIT on the learning curve in some respects;
particularly, in recognizing that ‘is’ doesn’t always speak in the same
voice; but, not too far ahead. neither AIT nor Heideggerianism takes the
obvious next step: until one knows in which voice of the is I speak when
I say ‘I am’ I just don’t know what I am.

in any case, your complaints about the Heideggerian use of ‘being’ are
misplaced. it is a historical/etymological accident that ‘being’ is a
gerund, a verb posing as a noun. since it is being used as a root
predicate, they may say that what ever is is a being of some sort just
as you may say that whatever is is an existent of some sort.

your complaint that ‘being’ and especially ‘being there’ just means
‘existing’ or ‘existence’ misses the point. each root predicate means
only that the subject of predication is — without indicating *how* it
is or in which way it is.

since the usage of any root predicate is co-extensive with ‘is’, your
root predicate is *supposed* to mean to you what some other root
predicate means to those whose prefer it.

similarly, your complaint that Heideggerianism is often treated as a
form of existentialism is a case of feigned outrage. AIT would also be
treated as a form of existentialism.

in addition to these similarities, there is the mutual acceptance of
locative determination. I’ve previously quoted a relevant passage from
BaT:

Heidegger writes: “The entity to which Being-in in this signification
belongs is one which we have characterized as that entity which in each
case I myself am [bin]. This expression ‘bin’ is connected with ‘bei’,
and so ‘ich bin’ [’I am’] means in its turn ‘I reside’ or ‘dwell
alongside’ the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a
way. ‘Being’ [Sein], as the infinitive of ‘ich bin’ (that is to say,
when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies ‘to reside
alongside …’, ‘to be familiar with …’. ‘Being-in’ is thus the formal
existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has
Being-in-the-world as its essential state.” [BaT. sec 12. p. 80]

now, it seems to me that Heidegger is taking the etymological
connotations of ’sein’ or ‘bin’ (which are locative) and attributing an
*essential* feature to each human: that it is inherently situated within
the world; that the locative attributed to the subject (the I that says
‘I am’) is a predicate because it further determinates the subject. this
is exactly what you are attempting to claim in your attempt to redefine
‘in the garden’ from an adverbial/locative complement to a subject
complement.

in both cases the redefinition means that, what was once a claim about
the place where the state described by the verb is, has become a claim
about what the subject of the verb is — about its so-called
existential modality.

not since the days when feudal lords held serfs and slave holders held
slaves has the definition of a person included a link to the place where
that person happened to be — defining where the person be-longed.

you and Heidegger share this belief in locative determination as you
would readily see if you applied to his thinking the same bizarre
analysis that you had to apply to your own to come up with the claim
that ‘in the garden’ further determinates the subject’s existential
modality.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, February 8th, 2009 at 7:00 am
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