An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being
March 16th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> >>would you not agree that what separates philosophy from ideology is
> >>just this principle: that the structure of a human, whatever that
> >>structure is, is the same for all humans?
>
> >Not the structure of “a human,” but rather the structure of “human
> >being.” The difference is that the former is an individual, while the
> >latter is a much more philosophically flexible way of putting it. I am
> >”a human.” But “human being” is less limiting.
>
> using the phrase ‘human being’ prejudices the inquiry into the question
> of being. compare the following two questions:
>
> [1]: is there Being or a being within a human?
>
> [2]: is there Being or a being with a human being?
>
> question [2] is prejudicial because the form of the question suggests
> the answer. in fact, [2] bears a striking resemblance to the question
> ‘when did you stopped beating your wife?’ posed by a prosecutor. the
> question *assumes* the defendant had been beating his wife over a period
> of time. this question is highly prejudicial if asked before the
> allegation of wife beating is proven.
>
> similarly, to pursue the question of being in an unprejudiced manner we
> have to ask [1] rather than [2].
And “a human” doesn’t prejudice the question from the start towards the
prioritization of the individual over Them? There is no way that “a
human” can designate Them, since “a human” designates one individual as
opposed to Others.
But on second thought, yes let’s start with “a human,” because as I
said, that will demonstrate precisely how the philosophically
prioritization of the individual leads straight to either skepticism or
idealism.
> >>1. Heidegger attributes a first-person perspective to dasein and
> >>illustrates its use by having dasein utter ‘I am’ — the same
> >>statement Descartes says is necessarily true. I don’t think we’re
> >>going to be able to discuss the ultimate philosophical catastrophe,
> >>sinking into the quagmire of SIS, without wondering how this
> >>statement, ‘I am’, is true when dasein says it; but, false when
> >>Descartes says it.
>
> >When Descartes or you say it, what is meant (as you yourself said) is
> >either a mind or a soul or a spirit or neurons. That’s the problem -
> >the manner in which you’ve casted the problem already presupposes the
> >prioritization of me over Them. That list of choices already discounts
> >from the start the possibility that “I” am really fundamentally Them.
>
> that list of choices is not an exhaustive list. it is intended to
> suggest an inquiry unprejudiced by the assumption that only physical (or
> only non-physical) possibilities are under consideration.
>
> need I point out that, if the inquiry prompted by the question ‘what am
> I?’ is to be *un*prejudiced, the list of possible conclusions is also
> the list of assumptions not to be made at the getgo? so, I don’t mind if
> we suspend the assumption that I am them in order to consider it as a
> possible conclusion.
>
> in any event, starting from a statement that Descartes, Heidegger and I
> (and you?) take as true, a self-asserted ‘I am’, how do you show that I
> can cause a philosophical catastrophe merely by *asking* what am I?
If your list is not limited to material or immaterial individual beings
(mind, soul, spirit, neurons), then there is no catastrophe.
> >>2. you have created a minor philosophical catastrophe of your own
> >>during the Hume’s brain thought experiment, discussion of which ended
> >>abruptly. you abandoned your argument without providing a rational
> >>defense of your claim that, after Igor cracks open Hume’s skull, you
> >>see a brain of reality type 1 whereas I see a brain of reality type 2.
>
> >We both see a phenomenal reality - me no more than you. We all have to
> >use our senses to see the brain. There’s no difference in reality type.
>
> alrighty then, we both see a brain of reality type 2. do you deny that
> there is a metaphenomenal reality correlated with the experience of
> seeing a brain of reality type 2?
I think that the concept of a “metaphenomenal reality” either means
nothing but the phenomena, or is devoid of any philosophical meaning.
