An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being
March 17th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being :: An Unprejudiced Inquiry into The Question of Being
Anthony Crifasi wrote:
Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>using the phrase ‘human being’ prejudices the inquiry into the
>>question of being. compare the following two questions:
>>[1]: is there Being or a being within a human?
>>[2]: is there Being or a being with a human being?
>>question [2] is prejudicial because the form of the question suggests
>>the answer. in fact, [2] bears a striking resemblance to the question
>>’when did you stopped beating your wife?’ posed by a prosecutor. the
>>question *assumes* the defendant had been beating his wife over a
>>period of time. this question is highly prejudicial if asked before
>>the allegation of wife beating is proven.
>>similarly, to pursue the question of being in an unprejudiced manner
>>we have to ask [1] rather than [2].
>And “a human” doesn’t prejudice the question from the start towards the
>prioritization of the individual over Them? There is no way that “a
>human” can designate Them, since “a human” designates one individual as
>opposed to Others.
>But on second thought, yes let’s start with “a human,” because as I
>said, that will demonstrate precisely how the philosophically
>prioritization of the individual leads straight to either skepticism or
>idealism.
okay, then; the game is afoot.
>>in any event, starting from a statement that Descartes, Heidegger and
>>I (and you?) take as true, a self-asserted ‘I am’, how do you show
>>that I can cause a philosophical catastrophe merely by *asking* what
>>am I?
>If your list is not limited to material or immaterial individual beings
>(mind, soul, spirit, neurons), then there is no catastrophe.
>>>>2. you have created a minor philosophical catastrophe of your own
>>>>during the Hume’s brain thought experiment, discussion of which
>>>>ended abruptly. you abandoned your argument without providing a
>>>>rational defense of your claim that, after Igor cracks open Hume’s
>>>>skull, you see a brain of reality type 1 whereas I see a brain of
>>>>reality type 2.
>>>We both see a phenomenal reality - me no more than you. We all have
>>>to use our senses to see the brain. There’s no difference in reality
>>>type.
>>alrighty then, we both see a brain of reality type 2. do you deny that
>>there is a metaphenomenal reality correlated with the experience of
>>seeing a brain of reality type 2?
>I think that the concept of a “metaphenomenal reality” either means
>nothing but the phenomena, or is devoid of any philosophical meaning.
in general, the phrase ‘metaphenomenal reality’ references a reality
beyond the phenomenon. in a specific case, it is the reality which is
correlated with the phenomenon in question. a metaphenomenal reality is
of type 1 (existential) or of type 3 (ontological). as indicated in a
previous post, I accept as true that the experience (a phenomenological
reality, type 2) of seeming to have a body is due to actually having a
physical body (existential, type 1).
for example, in the case of the moon illusion, the moon as it appears is
the phenomenological reality — the experience of seeing the moon near
the horizon seeming to be larger than normal. however, it is known that
the correlated metaphenomenal reality, the physical moon, does not
expand and contract in size. there is then a correlation between the
type 1 and type 2 realities; and, there is a difference between them.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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