Assumptions About Predicating Nothingness
April 27th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Unacknowleged Consequences :: Assumptions About Predicating Nothingness :: Assumptions About Predicating Nothingness :: Assumptions About Predicating Nothingness
>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>In your post of 2008-04-03, you acknowledged that you were trying to
>>disprove the assumption that one may not attribute predicates to
>>nothingness.
>>for the benefit of future googlers, the relevance of this assumption
>>is quite simply this: having established ‘I am’ have I established
>>’I am not nothing’? well, yes — provided that when attributing
>>predicates to ‘I’ (eg that I experience or that I am capable of
>>experiencing) I am attributing predicates to something rather than
>>to nothing.
>>So, Anthony, if you want to claim that I have not proven that I am
>>not nothing; then, you have to *either* admit assuming that *you*
>>can attribute predicates to nothingness, *or* present your proof
>>that this is possible.
>>it’s time to stop stonewalling, Anthony.
>>why don’t you just admit that you assume that you have the power to
>>attribute predicates to nothingness?
Answer the question, Anthony:
>>is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not proven by evidence based
>>logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>How many times have I had to point out to you that a modus tollens
>hypothetically presupposes what will be contradicted in the end? So
>that a modus tollens against the reality of myself will therefore
>presuppose myself in order to then contradict its reality? Instead, you
>inexplicably take contradiction as “self-refuting,” ignoring precisely
>how the argument worked.
Anthony,
are you *attempting* to mislead future googlers of ‘modus tollens’ —
the Crifasi variation?
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Clarification 1. Actual Operation of Modus Tollens
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modus tollens is the name for the following logical operation:
[1] P -> Q {Assumption Set 1}
[2] -Q {Assumption Set 2}
[3] (therefore) -P {Assumption Set 3 (Union of 1 and 2)}
in english, given a conditional proposition [1] and the negation of its
consequent [2], one may derive the negation of its antecendent at step
[3] … on the basis of all the assumptions on which either [1] or [2]
rested. the correct use of modus tollens means only that [3] is validly
derived from the assumptions of assumption set 3; in particular, it does
not mean that [3] is a free floating logical truth.
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Clarification 2. Status of the Conclusion Derived from Modus Tollens
======================================================================
you are being quite misleading when you say that you assume ‘I am not
nothing’ in order to refute that assumption via modus tollens.
‘I am not nothing’ is not assumed; rather, it is proven — based on the
assumption {A1}: it is not possible to attribute predicates to nothing.
[See my post of 2008-04-03, “Re: Behold the Power of Attributing
Predicates to Nothingness!”]
Let me restate it, using the following definitions
E = ‘I experience’
P = ‘I am not nothing’
Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’
[1] I experience.
this is a self-verifying fact.
[2] in asserting [1], I attribute a predicate, ‘capable of
experiencing’, to the referent of ‘I’. by {A1}, that to which predicates
are attributable can not be nothing; therefore, I, the referent of ‘I’
when I say ‘I experience’, am not nothing.
{This conclusion rests on fact [1] and assumption, A1}
one might restate the results thus far [1]-[3] as, ‘I experience;
therefore, I am (not nothing)’; or,
[3] E & (E -> P) {Assumption Set: A1}
{this is consistent with both Descarte’s cogito and Heidegger’s claim
that being (not nothing) is the ground of experiencing}
you proceed from here with your modus tollens:
[4] P -> Q {Assumption Set [4]}
{the assumption is the conditional statement as a whole not Q itself.
[4] symbolizes the claim that Q is the necessary condition for P. [5]
and [6] deal with whether Q is true or false — which you admit is a
different issues.}
[5] (subjective fact) I have no evidence that Q is true
[6] -Q {Assumes validity of the Crifasi Maneuver: Anthony Crifasi may
convert the absence of evidence into evidence of absence; but, only when
it suits him}
[7] -P {Assumption Set: [4], [6]}
obviously, the point here is that one does not conclude -P as an
absolute truth; but, rather, as a conclusion resting on certain
assumptions.
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Clarification 3: The Ultimate Choice
======================================================================
naturally, [7] is not the finally use of modus tollens that you make.
you can combine [3] and [7]; although, since you aren’t allowed to
deduce a denial of facts (-E), you deduce -A1: it is possible to
attribute predicates to nothing.
but that conclusion, -A1, will still rest on {Assumption Set: [4], [6]}.
so there is a choice to be made between:
C1: accepting A1 and rejecting at least one of {Assumption Set: [4],
[6]}
C2: accepting {Assumption Set: [4], [6]} and its conclusion -A1.
I’ve given my reasons for preferring A1 over -A1: A1 is assumed by
predicate logic and an analogous assumption is at the basis of axiomatic
set theory.
what is your rationale for preferring C2 on the basis of {Assumption
Set: [4], [6]} which have a consequence that undermines the very basis
of rational thought?
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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