Axiom 0 and its Translation (1)
December 29th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Yes, I Have No Holerons :: Axiom 0 and its Translation (1) :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Is Dasein a Reality?
In a message dated 29/12/2007 14:07:09 GMT Standard Time, jPolanik at nc.rr.com
writes:
Axiom 0 and its Translation (1)
1: The Map is Not the Territory
Michael Eldred wrote:
>Joseph Polanik schrieb Fri, 28 Dec 2007 12:04:56 -0500:
>>Axiom 0: (E P)(x)(Px).
>>translation: there is a predicate, P, such that, for any x that is, x
>>is P.
>ME: We started this debate with a question concerning the ontological
>difference which, you said, you did not understand. My efforts have
>been directed at showing that your axiomatic approach, which apparently
>aims at an exhaustive taxonomy of reality types, will never lead to any
>understanding of the ontological difference because, in the first
>place, the question concerning being per se must come into view.
okay; so, you admit that the ‘theory’ of the ontological difference is
framed by ‘the question concerning being per se’ which must come into
view first; but, may wish to reconsider what has recently been said
about the way declarative speech obscures the ground of the figure it
illuminates.
discussing ‘the question concerning being per se’ covers up the level
logically prior to the ‘question concerning being per se’ — the level
at which one chooses to bring into view the ‘question concerning Being’
or the ‘question concerning Existence’ or the ‘question concerning
Reality’.
at one point you seemed to understand this point: that which is does not
speak its own name.
that which is did not tell you ‘that which is is Being’.
that which is did not tell Jud ‘that which is is Existence’.
that which is did not tell Joe ‘that which is is Reality’.
those were choices we made.
you chose to make ‘Being’ the name for that which is; and, you are now
able to see (and, perhaps, even understand) what you call the
ontological difference — the Being of beings.
what is supposed to happen to Jud and me? having chosen alternate root
predicates (in your jargon, having brought alternate questions into
view), are we supposed to be unable to perceive the ontological
difference or not? are we supposed to be able to see analogous
differences? is Jud supposed to be seeing the ‘existential difference’
as to the Existence of existents? am I supposed to be seeing the
‘reality difference’ as to the Reality of realities?
if the [root predicate] difference can only be seen if you accept
‘Being’ as the name of all that is; and, no analogous differences (the
existential difference and the reality difference) are seen; then, is
that a point in favor of or a point against choosing ‘being’ as the root
predicate?
Joe
Jud:
Whilst I agree with the main thrust of what you say above Joe, I must point
out that you have unwittingly [not deliberately] misrepresented my position.
Yes, I prefer the clarity that the use of the word *exist* brings to
ontology, rather than the confusion and opportunities for lying and ‘cover-up* that
the mongrel conjugation of *be* inflicts upon ontological investigation -
but I deny *the existence of existence* just as much as I deny the *Being*
of being.*
Such reifications as *the reality of reality* don’t exist either.
Pull out the dummy [comforter] of *Being* from Fallacia’s metaphysical mouth
and he would be reduced to a mauling and mewing heap at the bottom of his
cognitive cot.
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)
“The greatest of all the spirit’s task is to produce a worldview.
The reconstruction of our age can begin only with a reconstruction
of its theory of the universe. There is hardly anything more urgent
in its claim on us than this which seems to be so far off and abstract.”
-From The Philosophy of Civilization by Albert Schweitzer
