be-ing does not “exist” and does “not exist”
September 19th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Forensic Fiddlesticks :: *Being* is *Nothing* :: Small but Important Correction: :: Etwas Raetselhaftes — Somewhat perplexing
Jud was very ready to claim recently:
> If as Heidegger and MichaelP claim; *Being* does not exist - it wipes the
> floor with the Platonic juvenility
> of his RECIPROCATION OF OPPOSITES wheeze, for if *Being* does not exist -
> its opposite other cannot either.
Very briefly now, Jud, just to make this clear (and not to enter into yet
another futile argument or false attack/defense wrt Heidegger, etc): be-ing
indeed does not “exist”, indeed is not any being, and certainly is not an
existing thing of any kind if “exists” is defined eliministically
(dogmatically/axiomatically, it seems to me, I have not yet read a word of
eliminatavism that actually reasons such a limitation) as being a “material
object” (where “material” can be happily augmented to include “energetic”
and “forceful”, etc, and “object” can happily take the forms of particle,
wave, field, etc). That is:
If X exists iff [if and only if] X is a material object
Then be-ing does not exist
Again, “material object” augmented to include a bunch of spatially proximal
material objects, a loosely ‘organised’ bunch of material objects, a
configuration of material objects or bunches of material objects, etc.
Moreover, even if “exists” is not confined {with or more likely without the
why? of this confining} to “material objecthood” but means being a being (a
thing of any kind whether material or no), be-ing still does not exist,
because: it is the be-ing of a being (or beings-as-a-whole), the way the
being is as the being that it is (and the way something is is not itself yet
another thing that has its way of being in turn — you see the possible ad
infinitum/ad nauseam here…).
Clear?
regards
michaelP
