Heidegger

In a message dated 02/04/2008 10:05:31 GMT Standard Time, jPolanik at nc.rr.com
writes:

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>but, there is no way to save your argument in its present form
>>>>without denying the assumption that one can not attribute predicates
>>>>to nothingness.

>>>>if it is so important to save your argument; then, just deny this
>>>>assumption.

>>>>go ahead. make my day.

>>>Done.

>>>So now, why do you assert it rather than deny it?

>>I’ve told you why. this assumption is built into predicate logic. why
>>do you deny it rather than assert it?

>Here’s why:

>1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.

>2. Therefore, if I know that I exist, I must know that there is
>something which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.

>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
>all my perceptions.

>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.

Let me make sure I understand you. I ask why you deny that attributing
predicates to nothingness is impossible; and, you reply by restating the
three premises and the conclusion of your argument. okay, so you are
admitting that your argument depends on assuming that attributing
predicates to nothing is possible; and, that may explain your motives;
but, you haven’t given any reasons for thinking that this assumption is
true or even plausible.

>Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e., that
>I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying that
>would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
>pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
>born, I am now X, I will die).

>That’s my argument against the particular “something” (i.e., “I”) in
>question here to which the predicates are to be attached. Now, don’t
>try the old trick of saying you answered this before, because this was
>your answer:

>>I-2 reject the first and third of the examples you give. I-2 know that
>>I-1 was born and that I-1 will die;

>to which I responded:

>>>I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes’ arguments in the First
>>>Meditation, how again do we “know” that there are any physical bodies
>>>at all? It’s astounding that at this point, after I’ve cited
>>>Descartes’ First Meditation numerous times now, you just glibly bring
>>>in I-1 without addressing his arguments there.

>There you go - I have an argument, and you have a pure assumption. So,
>address the argument.

Anthony,

it seems that you just don’t understand the impact of your admission
that the ‘I’ in your argument (the three Crifasi premises and the
skeptical conclusion derived therefrom) applies to any ‘I’ of any
reality type (ie. to any of my subscripted pronouns).

Remember? I asked:

>>what is the reality type (or mode of existence, etc) of the I that
>>does draw a skeptical conclusion about itself.

you replied:

>Any of them.

that’s a pretty strong statement. you are claiming that your argument
remains true when applied to an I of any reality type. in a sense,
you’ve made the word/symbol ‘I’ into a variable which ranges over a
certain set of proposed reality types. you say the argument “covers all
three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3 are not phenomenal,
while I-2 is phenomenal”.

so, you’ve undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
chosen reality type.

ok. I choose the I-3.

to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.

[NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]

go ahead, give it your best shot. present any evidence and any arguments
you may have for the proposition that “I-3 remain self-identical
throughout all my perceptions” and for the justification that this is a
necessary condition of my (the I-3’s) existence. in reviewing your
argument, we might find that it is fallacious for reasons completely
unrelated to your attempt to attribute predicates to nothingness.

at the end of the day, however, you still have to deal with your claim
that *any* I (of *any* reality type for which there are referents) may
conclude ‘I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I
am not nothing’.

I have shown that any such conclusion (irregardless of the reality type
of that which asserts it) is self-refuting — if one assumes that
attributing predicates to nothingness is *impossible*.

so, to save the argument by which you hope to confine non-heideggerian
philosophers to the quagmire of SIS, you must prove that it is
possible to attribute predicates to nothingness.

Joe

Jud
The concept of *nothingness* is the particular mode of the human
neurological system when it selects the word *nothing* as a nominal bereft of any
denotatum in an attempt to denote the past, present and permanent absence of
some unspecified entity or entities. The cognitive intellection *nothing* is
ALWAYS used as a non-existent *other* (a heteron) for purposes of comparing
occupied rather than unoccupied space. The problem is for the *neurologically
challenged* is that they naively asume that the very process of employing
this ontological device neurologically instantiates *nothing* by the very fact
that it *appears to be* the opposite of *some thing*

The key to understanding *nothing* is the be aware that *nothing* is not
*the opposite* nor a direct or indirect *antonym* of *something.*

As such is the case, no predication is possible in the case of the word
*nothing.* Any predication *thought to be* attributed to the word *nothing*
does not add to or provide any information about the concept of *nothing,*
because *nothing* does not exist to be described, but merely adds to what can be
said about the existential modality and neurological processes of he or she
who thinks about the concept *nothing.*

Jud

Posted on Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008 at 10:15 am
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