Heidegger

GEVANS613 at aol.com wrote:

>jPolanik@nc.rr.com writes:

>>at the end of the day, however, you still have to deal with your claim
>>that *any* I (of *any* reality type for which there are referents) may
>>conclude ‘I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I
>>am not nothing’.

>>I have shown that any such conclusion (irregardless of the reality
>>type of that which asserts it) is self-refuting — if one assumes
>>that attributing predicates to nothingness is *impossible*.

>>so, to save the argument by which you hope to confine non-heideggerian
>>philosophers to the quagmire of SIS, you must prove that it is
>>possible to attribute predicates to nothingness.

>Jud:

>The concept of *nothingness* is the particular mode of the human
>neurological system when it selects the word *nothing* as a nominal
>bereft of any denotatum in an attempt to denote the past, present and
>permanent absence of some unspecified entity or entities. The cognitive
>intellection *nothing* is ALWAYS used as a non-existent *other* (a
>heteron) for purposes of *comparing occupied rather than unoccupied
>space*. The problem is for the *neurologically challenged* is that
>they naively asume that the very process of employing this ontological
>device neurologically instantiates *nothing* by the very fact that it
>*appears to be* the opposite of *some thing*

>The key to understanding *nothing* is the be aware that *nothing* is
>not *the opposite* nor a direct or indirect *antonym* of *something.*

>As such is the case, no predication is possible in the case of the word
>*nothing.* Any predication *thought to be* attributed to the word
>*nothing* does not add to or provide any information about the concept
>of *nothing,* because *nothing* does not exist to be described, but
>merely adds to what can be said about the existential modality and
>neurological processes of he or she who thinks about the concept
>*nothing.*

your neurological speculations (in this and your other recent post) may
have some merit; and, perhaps, someday we will have a quantum
neurochemical explanation for basic features or philosophical ‘choices’.
but even then, as now, we will need the linguistic resources to be able
to discuss the illusion until it is seen as an illusion.

one of the oldest and most deeply rooted of philosophical illusions is
the belief that one may attribute predicates (ie properties, qualities,
attributes, etc.) to nothing. we have to have a way to say this even as
we acknowledge that, linguistically, the last word of my previous
sentence is a noun; and, therefore, it looks like I’ve just referred to
a thing.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Thursday, April 3rd, 2008 at 9:20 am
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