Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >2. Therefore, if I know that I exist, I must know that there is
> >something which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
> >all my perceptions.
>
> >4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
>
> Let me make sure I understand you. I ask why you deny that attributing
> predicates to nothingness is impossible; and, you reply by restating the
> three premises and the conclusion of your argument. okay, so you are
> admitting that your argument depends on assuming that attributing
> predicates to nothing is possible;

No, it assumes that predicates about me are indeed attributed to
something - namely, to ME. That’s what a modus tollens argument does -
it hypothetically assumes what will be negated.

> >Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e., that
> >I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying that
> >would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
> >pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
> >born, I am now X, I will die).
>
> >That’s my argument against the particular “something” (i.e., “I”) in
> >question here to which the predicates are to be attached. Now, don’t
> >try the old trick of saying you answered this before, because this was
> >your answer:
>
> >>I-2 reject the first and third of the examples you give. I-2 know that
> >>I-1 was born and that I-1 will die;
>
> >to which I responded:
>
> >>>I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes’ arguments in the First
> >>>Meditation, how again do we “know” that there are any physical bodies
> >>>at all? It’s astounding that at this point, after I’ve cited
> >>>Descartes’ First Meditation numerous times now, you just glibly bring
> >>>in I-1 without addressing his arguments there.
>
> >There you go - I have an argument, and you have a pure assumption. So,
> >address the argument.
>
> Anthony,
>
> it seems that you just don’t understand the impact of your admission
> that the ‘I’ in your argument (the three Crifasi premises and the
> skeptical conclusion derived therefrom) applies to any ‘I’ of any
> reality type (ie. to any of my subscripted pronouns).
>
> Remember? I asked:
>
> >>what is the reality type (or mode of existence, etc) of the I that
> >>does draw a skeptical conclusion about itself.
>
> you replied:
>
> >Any of them.
>
> that’s a pretty strong statement. you are claiming that your argument
> remains true when applied to an I of any reality type. in a sense,
> you’ve made the word/symbol ‘I’ into a variable which ranges over a
> certain set of proposed reality types. you say the argument “covers all
> three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3 are not phenomenal,
> while I-2 is phenomenal”.
>
> so, you’ve undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
> merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
> chosen reality type.
>
> ok. I choose the I-3.
>
> to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
> prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
> that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
> is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.
>
> [NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
> I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
> or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]
>
> go ahead, give it your best shot. present any evidence and any arguments
> you may have for the proposition that “I-3 remain self-identical
> throughout all my perceptions” and for the justification that this is a
> necessary condition of my (the I-3’s) existence.

already gave the argument for that, Joe:

>> >Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e., that
>> >I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying that
>> >would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
>> >pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life

Since the argument (remember? of course you don’t) appealed to the
identity of the first person pronoun, then if you deny this argument,
you would have to come up with some other possible justification for the
identity of the first person pronoun even if there were no identity at
all in its referent(s). I don’t think you can, which is probably why you
didn’t take that route last time, choosing instead this one:

>> >>I-2 reject the first and third of the examples you give. I-2 know that
>> >>I-1 was born and that I-1 will die;

to which I responded:

>> >>>I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes’ arguments in the First
>> >>>Meditation, how again do we “know” that there are any physical bodies
>> >>>at all? It’s astounding that at this point, after I’ve cited
>> >>>Descartes’ First Meditation numerous times now, you just glibly bring
>> >>>in I-1 without addressing his arguments there.

So, give it your best shot.

> at the end of the day, however, you still have to deal with your claim
> that *any* I (of *any* reality type for which there are referents) may
> conclude ‘I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I
> am not nothing’.
>
> I have shown that any such conclusion (irregardless of the reality type
> of that which asserts it) is self-refuting — if one assumes that
> attributing predicates to nothingness is *impossible*.
>
> so, to save the argument by which you hope to confine non-heideggerian
> philosophers to the quagmire of SIS, you must prove that it is
> possible to attribute predicates to nothingness.

Nope, wrong again. I only have to prove that the necessary condition for
attributing predicates to me (i.e., my identity throughout my existence)
is assumed without evidence. That’s what I’ve done.

Posted on Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008 at 12:45 pm
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