Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>>>1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.

>>>2. Therefore, if I know that I exist, I must know that there is
>>>something which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.

>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
>>>throughout all my perceptions.

>>>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.

>>Let me make sure I understand you. I ask why you deny that attributing
>>predicates to nothingness is impossible; and, you reply by restating
>>the three premises and the conclusion of your argument. okay, so you
>>are admitting that your argument depends on assuming that attributing
>>predicates to nothing is possible;

>No, it assumes that predicates about me are indeed attributed to
>something - namely, to ME. That’s what a modus tollens argument does -
>it hypothetically assumes what will be negated.

your argument makes several assumptions. you have three explicitly
stated (numbered) premises and now this formerly unacknowledged
assumption that attributing predicates to nothing is impossible.

it sounds seems you are saying that, when you run thru your argument and
reach a contradiction, the assumption you choose to deny is the formerly
unacknowledged assumption that attributing predicates to nothing is
impossible — thus proving that attributing predicates to nothing is
possible.

is that correct?

>>>Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e.,
>>>that I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying
>>>that would be denying an identical referent for the identical first
>>>person pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life
>>>(I was born, I am now X, I will die).

Assumption {A1}: that attributing predicates to nothing is impossible

[1] I experience.

this is a fact from which evidence based logical deduction can proceed

[2] in asserting [1], I attribute a predicate, ‘capable of
experiencing’, to the referent of ‘I’.

[3] (therefore) I, the referent of ‘I’ when I say ‘I experience’, am not
nothing because of [2] and {A1}.

one might restate the results thus far [1]-[3] as, ‘I experience;
therefore, I am (not nothing)’.

however, since you have cast your argument in the jargon of necessary
conditions, I’ll restate it thus:

[4] given that I experience, it is necessarily true that I am not
nothing

your argument is an attempt to continue the processes of reasoning from
this point as follows:

[5] (hypothesis) given that I am not nothing, it is necessarily true
that I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.

[6] (supposed fact) I have no evidence that I remain self-identical
throughout all my perceptions

most people would say that [6] was an admission that hypothesis [5] is
ungrounded. after all, if there is no evidence that the proposition ‘I
remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is true at all,
what possible basis could one have for claiming that this proposition is
*necessarily true*?

but, unlike most people, you conclude

[7] (therefore) I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction
that I am not nothing

I have previously shown that, given {A1}, [7] is self-refuting; but,
rather than admit your argument has gone down with the House of Usher,
you conclude

[8] -{A1}

you deny the initial assumption of the argument, effectively concluding
‘it is possible to attribute predicates to nothing’!

>>so, to save the argument by which you hope to confine non-heideggerian
>>philosophers to the quagmire of SIS, you must prove that it is
>>possible to attribute predicates to nothingness.

>Nope, wrong again. I only have to prove that the necessary condition
>for attributing predicates to me (i.e., my identity throughout my
>existence) is assumed without evidence. That’s what I’ve done.

look again. the lack of evidence you admit at [6] means that your
hypothesis at [5] (that it is necessarily true that I remain
self-identical throughout all my perceptions) is assumed without
evidence.

this is something not generally considered a virtue in logical thought.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Thursday, April 3rd, 2008 at 11:30 am
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