*Being* is *Nothing* - *there is nothing to be named.*
August 31st, 2006, search relatedRelated posts :: *Being* is *Nothing* :: *Being* is *Nothing* :: *Being* is *Nothing* :: *there is nothing to be named.* - cause and effect
Cologne 31-Aug-2006
GEVANS613 at aol.com schrieb Wed, 30 Aug 2006 09:33:05 EDT:
> Dr Michael Eldred: Yes, “*Being* does not *name* anything - for there
> is nothing to be named.” Strangely, we agree that being is nothing,
> you in the form of denial, I in the form of affirmation. Children, and
> most other people, do not need to know anything about dimension to
> play out their lives. They take it for granted — a luxury that those
> who practise ontological thinking cannot afford. Jud:Sorry Dr. Eldred,
> Look again. I did NOT say that *Being* is Nothing* - I said *there is
> nothing to be named.*
ME: Depends on how you read this last statement.
I agree that “beng is nothing” is a misleading way of putting it. “Beng
is no thing” would be somewhat better, to start with. Being does not
come to stand as a being in presence. Nor does being stand as a being in
absence. Rather, following the later Heidegger, who dispenses with the
word “being”, a paratactic mode of formulation is preferable: Being –
dimension of absence/presence — nothing: the same. Or, following Hegel,
being — “indeterminate, pure immediacy” — “pure abstraction” –
“nothing” (Hegel Enz. I §86f) The “in-” in “indeterminate”, the “im-” in
“immediacy”, the “ab-” in “abstraction” all point to a negation, a
withdrawal. Or one could say: being — time — the same. Alternative
(positive) names for being include: clearing, the open, the enabling
dimension, timespace.
So, of course you are right: being and nothing do not exist; if they
existed, they would themselves stand out (exi-stere) in the open which
they themselves are.
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_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
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> JUD: So I ‘m afraid that I do not agree with your employment of the
> *is of identity* in your tautologous coupling of *Being* and *Nothing*
> as - *Being is Nothing.* on this occassion.(Compare *Elizabeth
> Alexandra Mary Windsor *is* *Elizabeth II of Great Britain.*)Your
> ontological position appears to be this:(1) *Being* *is* Nothing.
> (*Being* = *Nothing*) Comment: Something that does not exist (A)
> cannot be described as being the same as, equalling or being
> tantamount to something else (B) which does not exist, because (A)
> does not exist to be evaluated and designated as being the same as
> either something else that exists or something else which does not
> exist and (B) does not exist to be selected and identified as being
> the same as, or another version of something else which exists or does
> not exist. (2) Therefore you believe that *Nothing* exists, because
> the *is* of your affirmation: *Being *is* Nothing,* attributes the
> quality/state of *Being* [of existing] to
> *Nothing.*Comment: The copula, *is* is the present simple 2nd person
> tense of BE, and is used in this case to attribute to *Being* a
> particular quality or characteristic, in this case the subject *Being*
> is instantiated in the state of existing as: *Nothing.* (3) If for Dr
> Eldred *Being* is *Nothing,* and therefore *Nothing* exists, then
> *Being* also exists, for he affirms that *Being *is* Nothing.*Comment:
> If as Dr Eldred affirms *Being* is *Nothing,* then *Nothing* must be
> *Being,* and if *Nothing* exists as *Being* then *Being* must exist
> [or not exist] as *Nothing.* If on the other hand Dr Eldred affirms
> and insists that neither *Being* or *Nothing* exist, then how can they
> be the same thing, for to be the same as something else requires that
> both *somethings* exist [or do not exist] to BE be like each other -
> and if they do [or do not] exist as separate things which are the
> same - then they cannot have been separate things in the first
> place?(4) Therefore it follows [logically] that Dr. Eldred believes
> that both *Being* and *Nothing*exist.Comment: If Dr Eldred DOES
> believe that *Being* and *Nothing* exist [or do not exist] perhaps he
> could kindly inform us of the epistemic evidence or reasoning which
> caused him to adopt this belief? Did he for example arrive at it as
> the result of *an act of will* or a *choice,* or does he believe that
> it is the result of a concatenational chain of experiential
> events?regards,Jud Evans. Personal Website:
> http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…
>
