*Being* is *Nothing* - *there is nothing to be named.*
August 31st, 2006, search relatedRelated posts :: *Being* is *Nothing* :: *Being* is *Nothing* :: *Being* is *Nothing* :: *there is nothing to be named.* - cause and effect
In a message dated Cologne 31-Aug-2006 _artefact at t-online.de_
(mailto:artefact@t-online.de) writes:
_GEVANS613 at aol.com_ (mailto:GEVANS613@aol.com) schrieb Wed, 30 Aug 2006
Dr Michael Eldred: Yes, “*Being* does not *name* anything - for there is
nothing to be named.” Strangely, we agree that being is nothing, you in the form
of denial, I in the form of affirmation. Children, and most other people, do
not need to know anything about dimension to play out their lives. They take
it for granted — a luxury that those who practise ontological thinking
cannot afford. Jud: Sorry Dr. Eldred, Look again. I did NOT say that *Being* is
Nothing* - I said *there is nothing to be named.*
Dr. Eldred: Depends on how you read this last statement. I agree that “being
is nothing” is a misleading way of putting it. “Being is no thing” would be
somewhat better, to start with. Being does not come to stand as a being in
presence.
Jud: Agreed. That which is nothing or no thing cannot sit, stand or indulge
in any of the existential modalities of a human being.
Dr. Eldred: Nor does being stand as a being in absence.
Jud: True. That which does not exist can neither be present or absent.
Dr. Eldred: Rather, following the later Heidegger, who dispenses with the
word “being”, a paratactic mode of formulation is preferable: Being — dimension
of absence/presence — nothing: the same. Or, following Hegel, being –
“indeterminate, pure immediacy” — “pure abstraction” — “nothing” (Hegel Enz. I
§86f)
Jud: As usual I find what you write interesting and informative. Of course,
I though I admire your erudition I still have to disagree with your
conclusions. If there is any difference in meaning twixt *nothing* and *no thing* then
it is that embedded in the term: *no thing* there is semantic hint,
suggestion or inference that there exists perhaps another a realm of non-existents
which ARE not things, whereas *nothing* is an outright rejection, denial or
negation of corporeality [and for me - also incorporeality.]
For me the Hegelian parataxis and the Heideggerian recourse to dumping
*Being* is simply a clever [but not clever enough] way of junking the
co-ordinating copuletic predicational mechanism, which is at the root of the ontological
*clarity* or *confusion* [take your pick depending on one’s philosophical
position.]
Very significantly it is junking of the word BE, in its simple-present
conjugational guise, provides the ontological escape-hatch for transcendentalists.
Why?
Because once the existentialising indicant BE is dispensed with and the
communicational laws or semantic guidelines of human communication and
intercourse are ignored - we can say what the hell we like, and introduce as many
ontological illogicalities we choose. Hence any form of elisional parataxis or
copuletic omission by paratactical clausal juxtaposition is a well know
ontological cop-out.
Dr. Eldred: The “in-” in “indeterminate”, the “im-” in “immediacy”, the
“ab-” in “abstraction” all point to a negation, a withdrawal.
Jud: It is surprising that Heidegger [from his ont. P. O. V] didn’t employ
the similar German prepositional negative *nicht* to flag up unbeing, inbeing
or imbeing etc? Perhaps the German *Nichtsein,* or some conjugational
modification thereof would have sufficed? [compare the: *Sein oder Nichtsein* of
Hamlet.
Though there are many nugatory/frivoulous examples of *unbeing* on the
internet, and there are lots of English instances of the coupling of *un-* which
relate to specific negations of unique existential modalities of the types -
*unbeknown, unbeknownst, unbelief, unbecoming etc. I am not aware of any
philosophical or ontological usage of the term *Unbeing* in the literature of the
tradition? The Farlex Free Dictionary includes it as: Un*be”ing a. Not
existing, and e. e. cummings famously quipped: *Unbeing dead isn’t being alive.*
Dr. Eldred:
Or one could say: being — time — the same. Alternative (positive) names
for being include: clearing, the open, the enabling dimension, timespace.
Jud:
The *enabling dimension* smells of Deism to me - the existence of an
*enabler* and hence intentionality and possible dragging teleologicality in its
Wiccalike wake.
I prefer my own term *The existential imperative,* or the symmetries and
constants of ‘the physics of the possible’ if you prefer, which peremptorily
determines that ‘to exist’ is analogous *to change and to cause change* In other
words if objects could not or did not change - they could not and would not
exist.
This fact of an absolute correspondance twixt *existence* and change* is the
ontological pig-stabber [a feature of the Famous Swiss Army Knife] that
severs Heidegger’s jugular. *Being*- [whether conceived of as either a
*universal existent,* or as a non-representational formulation for the existential
experience of Dasein, is physically and ontologically and philosophically
infeasible - for nature, physics, phusis, clearing, the open, the enabling
dimension, timespace and my own existential imperative would be stillborn and
cosmically impossible being characterised by *Becoming* - not by *Being.*
Bottom line? Only objects that become modified versions of themselves, or
change and become components of other changing objects exist. Humans [though
many of them are very bright] are not excluded from these cosmic laws, and we
are second by second, minute by minute becoming new versions of our
physio-neurological selves. Heidegger’s failing was that he just did not think deeply
enough and seriously enough concerning these important ontological cosmic
facts. Once this ontological inadequacy in Heidegger is recognised and
identified, his writings become discernible as no more than cleverly observed
anthropo-socio-political commentary - and in this sense I agree with Husserl’s
characterisation of his colleague in this vein.
Dr. Eldred:
So, of course you are right: being and nothing do not exist; if they
existed, they would themselves stand out (exi-stere) in the open which they
themselves are.
Jud:
In a sense such notions of *Being, Time, Nothing, Presence* etc could be
said to conceptually *stand out* or be instantiated representationally, as being
the ideational, template-based activity of the human brain, which
neurologically and synapsally configures itself to symbolise such ideational activity.
But it is still important to grasp that it is the thinking, ideating human
that actually exists and not the ideational activity itself.
regards,
Jud Evans.
Personal Website: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…
