Broken Tools
June 25th, 2006, search relatedRelated posts :: broken tools :: Broken Tools :: Broken Tools :: Broken Tools
Tags: religion
>>From: allen scult
>
>>Religion finds its true nature only in philosophy, which knows enough to
>>investigate religion not in its particular effects, not in its particular
>>embodiments, but in its being–religion as as such. Religion gives itself
>>to thinking as what it is, as how it is what it is.
Anthony replies:
> Isn’t that assumption philosophically equivalent to Husserl’s assumption
> that equipment finds its true nature only in scientific analysis, that it
> gives itself to theoria as what it is? And according to Heidegger, doesn’t
> that end up depriving it of its very equipmentality? Similarly, couldn’t
> someone (me!) argue that philosophy deprives faith of its faith-full-ness,
> precisely by depriving it of its particular effects? If religion shows
> itself most “as what it is” in abstraction from “its particular effects,”
> then isn’t this just philosophy of religion, not religion (just as equipment
> becomes “things that we use” to theoria)?
Necessarily, another qickie (I’m rushing down deadlines the mo’): hi
anthony, in your and allen’s writing it seems we can distinguish (at least)
three different performances/showings of ‘religion’:
1) religion showing itself through/in philosophical discourse (what I would
call ‘thinking {the be-ing of} religion’… this would show both (the crypt
and encryption of) be-ing and thinking in their relatedness as well as
‘religion’;
2) ‘the’ so-called ‘philosophy of religion’ (a discursive practice in which
the phenomenon of religion is a topic or subject for philosophy {as
something like a science marking off and sub-jecting parts of
be-ing-as-a-whole, as a brand or sector of philosophy, a bit like ‘The Arts’
{the art business} being a sector of Culture, basically along the lines of a
business enterprise)… [incidentally, I think that one of the most
attractive and redeeming features of Heideggerian thinking is the utter
absence of the ‘philosophy of X, Y’, etc, in its various discourses, but
that’s just me];
3) religious practice/theory its self (whatever that is, exactly: in its own
words, perhaps?).
Of course, along with (2) we can add such disciplines as the sociology of
religion, the history of religion, etc.
It seems to me that it might be highly desirable to make such distinctions
rather more explicit when we discuss religion and to make those altogether
distinct from the discussion on ‘faith’ [or is this the same? is faith only
religious faith? is the essence of religion, faith? is the practice of
faith, religion?]
regards
michaelP