Broken Tools
June 26th, 2006, search relatedRelated posts :: broken tools :: Broken Tools :: Broken Tools :: Broken Tools
>From: “michaelP”
>Necessarily, another qickie (I’m rushing down deadlines the mo’): hi
>anthony, in your and allen’s writing it seems we can distinguish (at least)
>three different performances/showings of ‘religion’:
>
>1) religion showing itself through/in philosophical discourse (what I would
>call ‘thinking {the be-ing of} religion’… this would show both (the crypt
>and encryption of) be-ing and thinking in their relatedness as well as
>’religion’;
>
>2) ‘the’ so-called ‘philosophy of religion’ (a discursive practice in which
>the phenomenon of religion is a topic or subject for philosophy {as
>something like a science marking off and sub-jecting parts of
>be-ing-as-a-whole, as a brand or sector of philosophy, a bit like ‘The
>Arts’
>{the art business} being a sector of Culture, basically along the lines of
>a
>business enterprise)… [incidentally, I think that one of the most
>attractive and redeeming features of Heideggerian thinking is the utter
>absence of the ‘philosophy of X, Y’, etc, in its various discourses, but
>that’s just me];
By “philosophy of religion,” I meant only religion as it shows itself
philosophically, not a demarkated subject area. The question is whether
religion shows itself most “as what it is” through a philosophical
explication, as Allen contends. I say no, for a reason that parallels
Heidegger’s denial of Husser’s claim that everydayness shows itself most
fundamentally through a scientific explication. I am arguing that the
philosophical treatment of religion apart from its “particular effects” and
“embodiments” exactly parallels the scientific treatment of everydayness
apart from its absorption in the world - apart from its being-alongside -
and is therefore vulnerable to a parallel critique.
>3) religious practice/theory its self (whatever that is, exactly: in its
>own
>words, perhaps?).
rather - in its own sight, not philosophical sight, just as Heidegger denied
Husserl’s claim to interpret everyday sight in terms of
scientific/theoretical sight.
>Of course, along with (2) we can add such disciplines as the sociology of
>religion, the history of religion, etc.
>
>It seems to me that it might be highly desirable to make such distinctions
>rather more explicit when we discuss religion and to make those altogether
>distinct from the discussion on ‘faith’ [or is this the same? is faith only
>religious faith? is the essence of religion, faith? is the practice of
>faith, religion?
Yes that’s what I would argue.