Heidegger

In a message dated 24/12/2008 11:18:44 GMT Standard Time,
_jpolanik at nc.rr.com_ (mailto:jpolanik@nc.rr.com) writes: Causal Agent or Causal Object?

_GEVANS613 at aol.com_ (mailto:GEVANS613@aol.com) wrote:

Joe:
phenomenologically, we experience ourselves as causal agents making causally
effective choices. so where does the belief in determinism come from?

Jud:
Phenomena is philosophical doctrine manqué proposed by the insufferable
scallywag Edmund Husserl based on the study of human experience in which
considerations of objective reality are not taken into account.

Joe:
let’s not get distracted by a cloud of verbiage. you’ve previously echoed
Richard’s position, “He [Richard] holds that even if antecedal determinism does
dictate the unfolding of events, and free will does not really pertain, it
is better to ignore it and carry on with one’s life as if the decisions which
me make are volitional. I agree with this second feature of his approach. For
reasons that I am willing to discuss as a separate question.”

focus, Jud! we’re discussing that question … separately … now.

it doesn’t matter whether one makes volitional choices because one has the
power to do so or whether one makes what seem to be volitional choices because
determining influences compel one to make those choices while also
compelling one to believe that it is necessary to pretend that they are volitional.
the end result is that one experiences being a causal agent rather than a
causal object.

Jud:
You are the one who needs to focus, particularly on the salient fact that
you are dealing clumsily with someone who is aware of every attempt
(attempts which you apparently see as *subtle* ) you make to twist his words or
misrepresent the views of your discussant. Failing that, it may simply be that
you lack to ability to read words and extract their correct meaning and are
determined to impose upon them a wishful thinking that somehow seems to support
your deterministically motivated paranormal, occultist agenda.

Read the paragraph again - it does NOT say that my position is that of
Richards - it intimates that I agree with Richard’s conclusion.

Here it is again

2. *He holds that even if antecedal determinism does dictate the unfolding
of events, and free will does not really pertain, it is better to ignore it
and carry on with one’s life as if the decisions which we make are volitional.
I agree with this second feature of his approach. For reasons that I am
willing to discuss as a separate question.*

As you know, I am a hard determinist for whom the question of Richard’s
*even if* does not even arise as far as my hard version of concatenational
determinism is concerned. My agreement with the second feature of his approach is
an agreement with his conclusions AS IT CONCERNS HIM and others like him,
who are not hard determinists such as I, but who prefer either to leave the
volitional door ajar, as evidenced by his use of the probationary: *even if, *
which a hard determinist would not use. THAT IS WHY I ADDED : *I agree with
this second feature of his approach. For reasons that I am willing to
discuss as a separate question.*

Joe:
one makes volitional choices because one has the power to do so or whether
one makes what seem to be volitional choices because determining influences
compel one to make those choices while also compelling one to believe that it
is necessary to pretend that they are volitional. the end result is that one
experiences being a causal agent rather than a causal object.

Jud:
My position is quite clear. FOR ME (and people like me) there is no
compulsion for one to believe that it is necessary to pretend that my actions are
volitional, but for some others, for reasons of their own, either because such
questions are considered to be trivial, unnecessary, unsettling, or even
plain boring, then it is better to ignore it and carry on with one’s life as if
the decisions which we make are volitional.

As far as your reference which suggests a difference between a causal agent
rather than a causal object I reject such a putative difference. Every object
in the cosmos is agential in the sense that it exists as an
effect-initiating entity - not to exist in such a state is a non sequitur.

Joe: the problems for your approach are that you haven’t got a coherent
theory to explain:

1. how determining influences can make one group of people (the Ubermensch
of philosophy) believe in determinism and another group of people (the
Untermensch of philosophy) disbelieve in determinism without creating a class
structure built into the fabric of the universe.

Jud: You are allowing your trannie slip to show with your choice of Nazistic
metaphors. Various people have various deterministic biographies which
condition their later thinking. It is precisely the effects of such determinative,
reificative misrepresentation both on children and adults which Antonio and
I have been discussing recently - see his now completed:

Reifications, Maps and Authorities here -
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/rossin10.htm_
 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)

Joe:
2. why determining influences would require us to act as if we disbelieved
determinism and exercised the power to take volitional actions.

Jud:
Unlike compatibilists who believe that free will and determinism are
compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically
inconsistent (people who hold this belief are known as compatibilists) people
such as I were initialised to adopt hard determinism as a feature of our world
outlook because of antecedal events. IOW we have been uniquely exposed to
enchained influences which manifested the obviousness of concatenationality
ranging from childhood, through schooling, college, university and exposure to
literature, the media, our professional or employment career influences and
the impact of the ideas of others, which together culminate in the formation of
this data into a world-view.

Others whose experiential catenulate biography is different do not form
these opinions and labour under the illusion that they make choices, but if they
do become aware, they may adopt a version of determinism such as biological
determinism, which claims that behaviour is the result of internal factors
over which we have no control, like genetic make-up; neuro-chemical changes in
the brain; bio-evolutionary needs (sex drive etc., or their version of
determinism might be based upon the belief that behaviour is the result of external
forces over which we have no control, like stimuli in the environment (e.g..
high temperature causes rioting); our learning experiences (e. g. the way we
have been nurtured by parents); conditioning (e.g. in the development of
phobias). There are even differences in emphasis within hard determinism (between
deterministic incompatibilists) like me who hold that free will and
determinism are logically incompatible categories - you can see a variety of hard
deterministic approaches here:
_http://www.rsrevision.com/diagrams/determinism.html_  http://www.rsrevision..com/diagrams/dete…)

Reifications - like biological entozoa are gut-enculturations which are
not
necessarily reliant upon nor benignly disposed to the welfare of their
hosts.

Sincerely,

Jud Evans.

Private Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)

*Common sense and a sense of humour are the same thing, moving at different
speeds. A sense of humour is just common sense, dancing.* William James.

Posted on Sunday, December 28th, 2008 at 7:01 am
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