Heidegger

Heidegger vs Descartes: Being Prioritized: Claim 2

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>you seem to be making three claims:

>>[2]: that prioritizing being-inside over being-alongside is a mistake
>>because “the enevitable and unavoidable result” is eternal skepticism,
>>solipsism, and ultimately idealism — precisely where Husserlian and
>>Cartesian philosophy ended up; and,

>>as I see it, claim [2] is empirically false. there are those asking
>>some form of ‘what am I?’ or (more likely) its third person analogue,
>>’what is a human?’. the fields of neuroscience and philosophy of
>>consciousness seem devoted to pursuing this and related questions;
>>but, eternal skepticism and solipsism are unknown within these fields
>>and idealism is extremely rare. the dominant philosophical position
>>within these fields is a monistic physicalism generally known as
>>’naturalism’.

>>clearly, it could be said that some of these researchers and
>>philosophers should question more deeply than they have. I would like
>>to see them actively investigate the origin of phenomenal awareness,
>>particularly reflexive self-awareness, instead of simply assuming that
>>these are brain functions.

>exactly.

>>however, you seem to think that these researchers and philosophers
>>have some sort of moral obligation to question so deeply that they get
>>stuck in the quagmire of skepticism, solipsism and idealism.

>I must be misunderstanding you. You can’t possibly be saying that if
>getting “stuck in the quagmire of skepticism” is the result when a
>position is philosophically questioned “so deeply,” that this then
>absolves one of any philosophical obligation for such deeper
>questioning!

>>in any event, you’ve offered no empirical evidence that asking ‘what
>>am I?’ inevitably results in a philosophy of a very specific features.
>>the practice of asking ‘what am I?’ and the closely related ‘who am
>>I?’ has been around for centuries as meditative exercises. if these
>>practices inevitably lead to such extreme results, don’t you think
>>we’d have empirical evidence by now?

>We do - it’s the evidence presented by Descartes in the First
>Meditation (from which the only escape he can think of is to prove
>God’s existence, which I assume you agree doesn’t work) and by Husserl
>in many texts in which he argues for the phenomenological reduction.
>But most cogsci philosophers and neuroscientists, as you point out,
>dogmatically assume from the start that it all comes down to brain
>functions. Both Descartes and Husserl would correctly point out that
>the arguments in the First Meditation call into question the existence
>of ALL material things, including the brain. The fact that they don’t
>address that problem doesn’t eliminate the problem.

let’s review.

your claim is that asking ‘what am I?’ prioritizes being-inside over
being-alongside; and, that this is bad because doing so leads
*inevitably* to a quagmire of skepticism, solipsism and idealism; but,
if the examples of Descartes and Husserl are the only evidence you have,
you haven’t proven the *inevitability* of sinking into that quagmire.

furthermore, pointing to Descartes’ doesn’t even support your case. it
is true that he attempts to prove that the experience of seeming to have
a physical body is due to actually having such a body; and, that this
proof fails because he failed to prove that there is a God; but, as you
have not demonstrating the logical necessity of making such an attempt,
you have not shown anything more than the limits of human reasoning.

one can simply accept that there is a physical world; and, … move on
to the next question.

it is true that by doing this philosophers do not removed the problem;
but, over the centuries since Descartes, the problem has been removed
from philosophers. defining the ultimate character of the physical
universe is no longer a task assigned to philosophers. it is now under
the jurisdiction of physicists and mathematicians.

so it is enough for me to accept that I experience having a body that
exists as a physical object; meaning, made of the same ’stuff’ as the
rest of the physical universe. I don’t have to know the ultimate
character of the physical universe; and, if I perchance want to know, I
would ask a physicist not a philosopher.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Saturday, March 8th, 2008 at 6:55 pm
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