Contradicting Heidegger
May 4th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Unacknowleged Consequences :: The Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly :: Heidegger vs Descartes :: The Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly
Schizo-Epistemology: Contradicting Heidegger
Anthony,
one of your crucial claims seems to be that the proposition ‘I remain
self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
of existence.
this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:
[1]: P -> Q
where
P = ‘I exist’ [’I exist’ == ‘I am not nothing’]
Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’
you also claim that Q is false; so:
[2]: -Q
>>==============================================================
>>The Structure of the Argument
>>==============================================================
>>let’s take a look at the structure of your argument that P -> Q is
>>true. there are a number of problems that remain despite the fact that
>>you’ve not dealt with them.
>>———————————————–
>>Problem 1: Contrary to Heidegger
>>———————————————–
>>from my post of 2008-04-16:
>>>toward the end of his career, Heidegger makes a startling admission.
>>>in discussion Descartes, Heidegger writes: “The formula which the
>>>proposition sometimes has, ‘Cogito ergo sum’, suggests the
>>>misunderstanding that it is here a question of inference. … The sum
>>>is not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is the
>>>ground of thinking, the fundamentum.”
>>>this is, of course, all that Descartes needs to prove ‘I experience;
>>>therefore, I am’.
>>>Heidegger is using ‘being’ as his root predicate (ie to carry the
>>>meaning ‘not nothing’) while we have been using ‘exists’ or
>>>’existence’; so, we must translate back and forth.
>>>once we notice experiencing anything at all, we deduce that the
>>>logical preconditions of experiencing have been satisfied; and, thus,
>>>we can say either: ‘I experience; therefore, I am’ or ‘given that I
>>>experience; it is necessarily true that I am’.
>>How do you explain how your proposition [1] can be made to appear
>>consistent with the passage I quoted from Heidegger?
>We’ve tried this before:
>http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-March/033704.html
in the unlikely event that future googlers discovery this thread, they
will find a philosophy professor, Anthony Crifasi, advocating a
schizo-epistemology so bizarre that it makes The Heidegger seem rational
in comparison.
yes, we have been here before. post 033704 from the arkive shows you, in
another context, avoiding discussion of Heidegger by saying “let’s leave
Heidegger aside for the moment”. that was 2008-03-11. it is now 6 weeks
later and you are still treading water in the tarn desparately trying to
avoid the conflict between Heidegger’s position and your new and
improved schizo-epistemology.
Answer the question, Professor.
How do you explain how your proposition [1] can be made to appear
consistent with the passage I quoted from Heidegger?
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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