Heidegger

I think that Coriando, in her book from 2002: Doctrine of
affects and phenomenology of moods, points out the problematic
of the end of metaphysics very clear, with regard to a subject,
which, within metaphysics, had its specific place, but which now,
at a moment that metaphysical determination seems impossible,
needs fundamental re-orientation. So: from a doctrine of affects
to a phenomenology of moods. The title suggests a clear and
unambiguous way, but that is not the case, because the goal is
unknown, and that implies that, really, also the point of departure
is unknown: metaphysics.

Coriando starts her investigation with Scheler, Husserl, Bollnow,
Brentano, who, after Nietzsche, began to explore the realm of the
emotive, the intentional, which had lost its ordened place it had
had in metaphysics. But they had no other tools than the traditional,
and this is the moot point of all philosophy since, incl. Heidegger.
therefore the road which Coriando walks, is interesting: she goes
back and forth to Pascal’s order of the heart, and eventually to
Aristotle, where the metaphysical realm gains a clear Gestalt for
the first time.

In the second part, after Heidegger 1 and 2, she turns to poetry,
Hölderlin, Goethe, Rilke. Only then.

I was reminded of the foreword by Arendt in Between past and future,
where she offers an alternative in a situation where there is no more
trespassing, also with Heidegger in the hinterhead.

I’ll give an example of the clear style of Coriando, who has written
important on the Contributions, and who is about to overtake the GA.

P. 11, 1st part, right after the intro. My translation.

“The basic experience of our era consists, spoken shortly, therein, that
the metaphysical right to an ontological-ethical justification of that-
which-is (des Seienden) can no longer be accepted as the SELF-EVIDENT
MODE OF EXECUTION of philosophical activity. Metaphysics itself, meta-
physics as such and in its systematic as well as historical (geschichtlich)
totality (Ganzheit), shows itself only in such radicality - more radical
than for instance in Kantian criticism - to be a philosophical problem.
If it is true that every reviving will to a, however defined, last founding
(Letztbegründung), fails over an experience of finitude, which is not
further clarifiable, then on the other hand a mere deconstructivist
(or “postmodern”) criticism of metaphysics, which simply debunks foundation
and the endowment of meaning as bottomless, reaches too short according to
its own essence and beforehand, because it declares the fact, that the
ideas of the grounding, the carrying (Tragenden), the meaningful are inscribed
in human being, apriori to be null. Because the claim (Anspruch) of the
meaningful can no longer be ENCASHED (eingelöst) by a positing (Setzung),
as a CLAIM however KEEPS ON EXISTING, neither a TRADITIONAL understanding of
metaphysics, nor an ANTI-, cf. mere A-METAPHYSICAL correspond to the real
meaning-direction of this experience. What is multifacetedly stated, but only
seldom THOUGHT beyond the purely destructive moment: the “end of metaphysics”
seems increasingly still to only begin to attain its historical meaning in the
view back to a tradition, which does not stop rebinding thuoght into the horizon
of its questions and attemptive solutions.”

In the background is here formal indication, first hermeneutically round BT, and
then seinsgeschichtlich, round the Contributions, where the indication is a wink
of Beying itself.

please and thanks

rene

Posted on Tuesday, July 4th, 2006 at 4:05 pm
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