Heidegger

>ME: No. Ignorance is temporally prior to the knowledge that dispels it, not
>ontologically prior. The enigmatic thing about philosophy, as I have said
>several times, is that it is knowledge of what we already know and of that
>with which we are already entirely familiar as human beings, but have never
>explicitly thought on deeply enough. By thinking on it, we may become human
>beings, although we are human beings already.

How can knowledge dispel something which has occurred earlier which is in contrast/opposition with itself? Ignorance and unknowing are distinct. Knowledge implies a subject, a learner, and a realization. That knowledge of some forms does occur at or after the event does not entail necessarily that ignorance preceded the knowledge of the event. Some events are not predicable, nor are they anticipated, even incipiently, thus there can be no generalizations, however valid, that all knowledge dispels in time, some events which cannot be predicted.

You can see this to be true with some rare initial events such as a new virus: at first the virus is confused with some other common ailment, then experts realize that the new ailment is caused by a previously unknown or discovered virus.

Another example may be witches. Witches were known to exist in New England at one time, and judges or governors, prosecuted witches for being possessed by the devil, as if they ‘freely chose’ to be witches. However after the Royal authorities deduced that there was no bases to ‘free choice’ regarding the alleged witches conduct, they could be not trying of witches in New England colonies.

The rub of the issue is that time, chronological time has no function in determining whether there are events which would support ‘ignorance’ being dispelled by time.

The fact of the matter is that knowledge does not dispel ignorance temporally, only recognition of the facts/supporting evidence/argument dispel ignorance.

One could argue that forgetting is about being ignorant after learning knowledge, and in that case ignorance is dispelled temporarily after knowledge. Also it should be stated that ignorance, as in forgetting, is about the defects of memory, fatique, old age or infirmity, and it can also be about forgiveness and exuberance.

Therefore the dispelling of ignorance is not about anything that can be generalized as to it’s temporal significance, but rather, au contraire, that it is precisely about the learning of ignorance and the recognition of knowledge which is freeing up of resources and energies.

If there had been certain recognitions regarding the ecology of viruses, and their antecedents, then we would have long time ago have eliminated yellow fever, aids, and other things like the common flue, but we have not, and that is not because we still ignorant, but rather we are still incapable of grasping their significance in terms of ecological circumstances, and their antecedents.

The example of Dr. Faustus comes to mind in that it was his desire to bring back the image of Helen of Troy, which he claimed he did, but this image was only an artifact, and not a true representation of the woman of his dreams, despite the accuracy of the representation.

There are certain errors and flaws which cannot be compensated for even by philosophy. Just as absolute wisdom presupposes absolute ignorance.

chao

John

Hi Michael,

How would you characterize the knowing (already known) which
philosophy knows (or is on the road to find out)? I never thought of
the primary “cognitive” activity of Dasein as a “knowing.” Perhaps
you didn’t mean it literally but were merely using “knowing” in that
sentence for the sake of the poetic parallels you drew. But at any
rate, I’d be interested in why you chose the word.

Regards,

Allen

Posted on Wednesday, November 21st, 2007 at 2:10 am
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