CPI vs OD
November 11th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: No related posts
Michael Eldred wrote:
>Joseph Polanik
>>Michael Eldred wrote:
>>>Joseph Polanik schrieb
>>>>it seems to me that the simple, undeniable CPI shows that there is
>>>>no the ontological difference in between subject and object —
>>>>until it is put in between ‘that’ and ‘what’.
>>>ME: Then you are claiming that the CPI has no presuppositions. It
>>>is supposed to be so plain and immediately obvious as to be
>>>”undeniable”. Formulating a “vs.” or opposition between an axiomatic
>>>CPI and the OD suggests that one can do very well without the latter
>>the CPI is a more fundamental starting point than the OD. one begins
>>to construct the OD in the attempt to answer ‘what am I?’
>ME: The sense of “more fundamental” here is that of “given to
>experience”, but it is precisely the task of philosophy to ask for the
>presuppositions for this givenness, i.e. not to take it for granted.
>And as I’ve said before, your setting up an opposition between CPI and
>OD is SPURIOUS because the latter is neither an axiom nor a
>starting-point, but has to be first brought to light by questioning the
>presuppositions for our experience,
the CPI is not an axiom. it is a statement. as a starting point, it is
prior to the OD — which is not a starting point.
>>>ME: What is presupposed in saying “I”? What is presupposed in asking
>>>”What am I”?
you seem to have a rather biased opposition to presuppositions. why
would you ask about the presuppositions of ‘what am I?’ but not about
the presuppositions of ‘who am I?’?
>>>Why should this “I” be somewhat at all?
>>because nothing unreal is self-aware.
>ME: Presupposes you have already clarified what “whatness” indicates.
are you claiming that something that is not real in any sense can
somehow be self-aware?
>>>To say “I” is already to presuppose a kind of self-awareness, i.e.
>>>an awareness of… bent back, or re-flected, upon itself. this is
>>>true; but, why would I want to start anywhere except with what is
>>>distinctively human?
>ME: The point being that to think “self-awareness” presupposes having
>thought through awareness, which is ontologically prior.
true, self-awareness presupposes awareness. what of it? can someone in a
coma proceed “by questioning the presuppositions for our experience”?
can someone without awareness contrast the “dimension of the
first-and-second person” or the “dimension of the first-and-third
person”
all aspects of philosophical inquiry presuppose awareness.
>>>To ask what I am presupposes that I am somewhat and
>>>leaves out of consideration whether I am, instead, somewho.
>>I’ve addressed the difference between whatness and whoness in my
>>recent reply to Jan.
>ME: Your reply to Jan merely made a distinction between the universal
>and the individual, which is inadequate to grasping the difference
>between whatness and whoness.
in my reply to Jan, I pointed out that asking ‘what am I?’ is a
first-person way of inquiring as to the structure of a human individual.
unless you are claiming that the structure of the human individual can
vary by, say, racial or ethnic grouping, the answer to ‘what am I?’ has
to be universal? would you not agree?
in contrast, asking ‘who am I?’ inquires about accidental features that
distinquish me from other humans. the features Jan mentioned were all of
this latter variety.
>In the phenomenon of whoness, at the very least, the dimension of the
>first-and-second person must come into play vis-à-vis the dimension of
>first-and-third person as the traditional dimension for ontological
>questioning in which whatness inter alia is situated.
whatness is ontologically prior to whoness. I have to be a human
individual before I can identify which one I am.
>>>Therefore the CPI cannot be taken as a starting-point for
>>>thinking. There are presuppositions which must first be thought
>>>through, namely, the ontological nature of the “I”
>>the CPI is taken as the starting point precisely because it
>>facilitates inquiry as to the reality type of the referent of ‘I’.
>>in previous posts I’ve mentioned that the root predicate has three
>>’types’ or ‘modes’ — which in my useage I’ve named:
>>1. existential (physical)
>>2. phenomenological (experiential)
>>3. ontological (non-physical being)
>ME: All of which I have questioned in a previous post.
>>each reality type is numbered as shown. now, in order to be precise
>>when precision is needed, it is possible to subscript the first person
>>singular pronoun according to the reality type asserted by its user.
>>[more on subscripted pronouns: http://what-am-i.net/symbology.htm]
>>you say that the use of ‘I’ presupposes self-awareness; and, I quite
>>agree. but which ‘I’ is self-aware? am I-1 self-aware? am I-2
>>self-aware? am I-3 self-aware?
>ME: Subscripts only formalize distinctions; they don’t bring anything
>to light.
thank you for acknowledging the quality of the workmanship that went
into constructing this system of subscripted pronouns.
*they were not intended to shine with any light of their own*.
they were intended to allow a speakers/writers/thinkers to illuminate a
murky situation with their own light.
>>when ‘what am I?’ is actually asked, presuppositions are not
>>acceptable as answers.
>ME: Hegel deconstructed the starting-point with the “I” two centuries
>ago. Cf. the introduction to his Logik (i.e. his ontology) with his
>critique of Fichte’s starting-point. I am not proposing
>”presuppositions” as “answers”, but showing that your axiom “I know
>that I am” is not fundamental, but itself based on presuppositions
>(what is the sense of “I am”?) that have to be brought to light as
>ontologically prior.
Among the distractions (non-answers) presupposed by this last paragraph
are:
1: that the CPI is an axiom. it is not. see above.
2: that you can quote only the first half of the CPI without distorting
it. the CPI is the whole statement, “I know that I am; but, not what I
am”.
3: that the CPI is not undeniably true as I have claimed. if you claim
that the first part (the part you quoted) is deniable; then, by all
means, *present* your denial. perform it; and, your performance of your
own denial will be self-refuting. the second part of the CPI is also
undeniable; but, for a different reason. since it reports a subjective
fact — my own awareness and assessment of what I know and do not know
— I am incorrigible (in the sense used by Rorty) as to this statement:
you could not possibly know that it is false. are you actually going to
allege that I know what I am when I say that I do not? in any event, if
you claim that you have knowledge sufficient to answer the ‘what am I?’
question; then, by all means tell us what it is, where it came from, and
how the state of not having that knowledge is not ontologically prior to
the state of having such knowledge.
5: that the OD does not have the presuppostions you allege the CPI has.
since I am claiming that the CPI is ontologically prior to the OD, it is
not really pertinent to claim that the CPI has presuppositions *unless*
you can show that they are not also presuppositions of the OD.
6: that I am claiming that there is nothing more to be brought to light
concerning the statement “I am”. not only have I not made such a claim,
I have presented tools with which to facilitate this bringing to light.
obviously, you are not required to use my tools; but, you haven’t said
what tools you have used instead — or what you’ve found thru their
use.
7. that what is brought to light is always an ontologically prior
presupposition. this unproven belief is itself a presupposition of your
claims above; and, a case could be made that what is brought to light in
the clarification of ‘I am’ is the necessity of choosing a root
predicate. the choice made is obviously subsequent to the bringing to
light the necessity for making a choice. in any event, the CPI is
ontologically prior to the OD because the CPI describes a state of
awareness prior to choosing a root predicate while the OD describes a
state of awareness subsequent to choosing a root predicate.
>>>The ontological difference, by contrast, is not an undeniable axiom,
>>>nor an unquestioned presuppostion, but rather only comes to light by
>>>questioning the presuppositions for all that is given to awareness,
>>>and that involves the world shaping up and showing itself AS
>>>such-and-such. The interposed AS is the question.
>>that is why I say the state of self-awareness described by the CPI is
>>more fundamental. at the point where I know only that I Am, the
>>referent of ‘I’ appears (in your terminology, shows itself); but, I
>>don’t yet know enough to say I appear (or am showing myself) *as* this
>>such-and-such instead of that such-and-such.
>ME: The paradoxical and unique thing about philosophy is that it brings
>to light through well-founded concepts (that’s the sense of
>phenomen-ology) what we as human beings always already understand (and
>must understand to be human beings), but do not know that we already
>understand it.
okay, so you are claiming that you already understand that the CPI is
ontologically prior to the OD; but, that you just don’t understand it
yet.
Perhaps this post will help. 
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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