Heidegger

Saicho at aol.com wrote:

>jPolanik@nc.rr.com writes:

>>Saicho@aol.com wrote:

>>>it is typical in dealing with math to say things like: There exists
>>>an X such that … etc.

>>do you then *define* ‘exists’ to mean ‘exists as a physical object’?

>Joe, absolutely and in all ways possible: NO, in the case of all things
>mathematical and in many other areas as well.

if we can’t define ‘exists’ to mean ‘exists as a physical object’; then,
it seems to me, we can’t define ‘is’ or ‘am’ to mean ‘is a physical
object’ or ‘exists as a physical object’. the true statement ‘there is
an even prime number’ would ‘prove’ something we know to be false.

similarly, we can’t define ‘is’ to mean ‘is a phenomenological reality
only’. such a definition might make you happy by giving you a rhetorical
advantage over Penrose — the true statement ‘there is an even prime
number’ would ‘prove’ that you were right and Penrose was wrong.
however, such an argument would hardly be convincing.

finally, we could not define ‘is’ to mean ‘is an ontological
reality’ (where ‘ontological reality’ referred to a metaphenomenal
non-physical reality that somehow ‘accounted for’ the corresponding
phenomenal reality the way that the perfect triangle in Plato’s heaven
of Ideal Forms accounted for all the imperfect triangles that partook of
the Ideal triangle). such a definition would ‘prove’ Penrose was right
and you were wrong; and, that seems equally unacceptable.

IMHO, it follows that ‘is’ and ‘am’ must be defined so that ‘it is’
asserts only that it is (not what it is) and that ‘I am’ asserts only
that I am (and not what I am).

would you not agree?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
 http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

Posted on Sunday, September 14th, 2008 at 6:01 am
comment | rss 2.0 | trackback