Heidegger

Taking Care of Isness: desCartes’ “I Am” vs daSein’s “I Am”.

That Pete wrote:

>Heidegger goes into the case of Descartes in some detail in the second
>half of the “Introduction to Phenomenological Research” lecture course
>(1924):

>”It should be noted how Descartes sees his own existence as a thing
>with determinate properties, how he sees it in the categorical
>determination of a given thing with properties.”

>P. 185

Descartes takes inventory of his properties in order to decided whether
the I, the phenomenological experiencer, has properties normally
associated with a body or properties normally associated with a soul.

is there a problem with this process?

>[and also a couple sentences later, regarding your post a couple days
>ago, the only place I know where Heidegger actually states the question
>”what am I?”, he does so, quoting Descartes:

>”The question: quid sum? [what am I?] is settled by the fact that
>Descartes says: sum res cogitans;”]

it is probably significant that Heidegger, despite acknowledging that
daSein always has a first person perspective, never speaks in the first
person as Descartes did so well in his Meditations.

in any case, ‘res cogitans’ must be understood in context. Descartes
clearly defines ‘thinking’ as we might define ‘experiencing’. [1]

so, in relation to my post of a few days ago, how does a Heideggerian
deconstruct desCartes’ “I am” without deconstructing daSein’s “I am”?

[hint: if anything in “Introduction to Phenomenological Research” (1924)
was pertinent, Heidegger could have cited it in BnT (1926), right?]

Joe

[1] Descartes: Sed quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe
dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans
quoque, & sentiens.
 http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/med…]

Vetch: But what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But
what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands,
[conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and
perceives.  http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/med…]

CSM: But what then am I? a thing that thinks. what is that? a thing that
doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also
imagines and has sensory perceptions. [CSM II: 19]

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Tuesday, February 5th, 2008 at 11:35 am
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