desCartes’ “I Am” vs daSein’s “I Am”.
February 14th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Is Dasein a Reality? :: desCartes’ “I Am” vs daSein’s “I Am”. :: Is Dasein a Reality? :: desCartes’ “I Am” vs daSein’s “I Am”.
I read Heidegger in that passage as saying that “I am” means that I appropriate or I
en-own myself, and not that I have a property called being, nor is that an assertion
that could be resolved to be correct or not according to some particular system.
Joseph Polanik wrote:
That Pete wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>I’ve previously mentioned my claim that both Descartes and Heidegger
>>would accept “I am” as a true statement. do you deny this; or, are you
>>claiming that Part II, Chapters 1-3 of *Introduction to
>>Phenomenological Research* contains an argument that “I am” is true
>>when daSein says it but false when desCartes says it?
>In what I referenced, Heidegger deconstructs Descartes’s claim. I have
>not come across a text where Heidegger accepts “I am” as a true
>statement, or otherwise discusses an “I am” of his own.
I’ve previously quoted it for you:
“Because Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must
always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’”.
[BaT. trans by Macquarrie and Robinson. p. 68]
let’s assume we all agree to overlook the gaping contradiction in
Heidegger’s statement: he uses the impersonal pronoun, it, to refer to
daSein while telling us to always use personal pronouns to refer to
daSein.
do you suppose that Heidegger would give us, as an example of using a
personal pronoun to address daSein, a statement that is false when
uttered by daSein?
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