desCartes’ “I Am” vs daSein’s “I Am”.
February 5th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Is Dasein a Reality? :: desCartes’ “I Am” vs daSein’s “I Am”. :: Is Dasein a Reality? :: desCartes’ “I Am” vs daSein’s “I Am”.
> [hint: if anything in “Introduction to Phenomenological Research” (1924)
> was pertinent, Heidegger could have cited it in BnT (1926), right?]
Introduction to Phenomenological Research was published a couple decades ago.
B&T summarizes the problems with Descartes, but that lecture course tackles passages from the Meditations in detail.
B&T was Heidegger’s first publication since completing his dissertation. And it was only published because when he was proposed for the philosophy chair at Freiburg, the ministry in Berlin complained that he hadn’t published anything.
> Descartes takes inventory of his properties in order to decided whether
> the I, the phenomenological experiencer, has properties normally
> associated with a body or properties normally associated with a soul.
>
> is there a problem with this process?
It takes the I out of context. A dis-embodied I is not the real I.
> so, in relation to my post of a few days ago, how does a Heideggerian
> deconstruct desCartes’ “I am” without deconstructing daSein’s “I am”?
Arguably, Heidegger does nothing but deconstruct. He invented to the term to describe his style of hermeneutics. And it is impossible to understand deconstruction, nor Derrida’s elaboration of it, without first grasping the ontological difference.
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