Determinism vs randomness[3]
August 4th, 2006, search relatedRelated posts :: On Determinism for People and for Particles :: Determinism vs randomness[3] :: Determinism and the Intellectual Class Structure of the Universe :: On Determinism for People and for Particles
on 19/7/06 10:52 AM, Bernx at aol.com at Bernx at aol.com wrote:
In a message dated 7/18/2006 10:25:17 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
rtsmitty at gmail.com writes:
On Jul 18, 2006, at 7:37 PM, Bernx at aol.com wrote:
In a message dated 7/18/2006 8:59:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
rtsmitty at gmail.com writes:
Philip Baker,
I fail to see how free-will would make deterrents ineffective. Free
will in any common conception does not free the person from all
conceivable realities, only those of deterministic origins. As far as
anything would make sense to a human, actions must be grounded in
some conception of reality, and then the function of deterrents at
the level of intelligibility would continue to be as effective as
they ever could be. Because even if people have free will, the world
is not completely random (or even random enough, as would be
necessary to assume the ineffectiveness of deterrents), which
therefore presupposes another medium through which examination of an
idea such as deterrent is possible, and more effective.
Can you name a “reality” that IS NOT deterministic and free of random
discourse?
Bernard
Many “realities” that are not based upon the assumptions of physics are free
from random discourse. Because insofar as the said “reality” is a human
institution, the basic assumptions are not required to be related in any way
to the domain of determinism (physics) while still remaining a reasonable
institution. Principles of justice exist in such a reality, as there is no
way to identify any such concept in nature or physics, and yet it is still
very reasonable and quite useful to humans.
[BXB]
Then you draw a line between the subjective presence and “physics.” Einstein
had the same notion and as if physics was all object and the subjective
“observer” subaltern to this assummed object reality. But in view of the
uncertainty principle and a notion of complementarity and compounded by
David Bohm’s notion of instanteniety and the phenomenon of non-locality
subject/object may no longer be postulated as complements but fused as
synchronicities, or acausal connection. These newer ideas compromise the old
patristic notion of a separate “object reality” that in and by itself is
deterministic, e.g., Einstein’s Constant for the propagation of the photon.
Why should it at all be conceivable that something could be useful if its
underlying assumptions are unfounded? In what arena can humans continue to
function if not under similar presuppositions of many current
institutions/ideas?
Even if we take the world as deterministic and use that to define all our
culture/institutional ideas, it would be quite useless for us. To be useful,
determinism would have to tell us more about what to do (and thus the
future) than simply absolve us of guilt. Because, insofar as we assume
determinism, we can only approximate it in predicting outcomes as an
algorithm will never replace what actually happens, giving only a crude
picture limited to set parameters. Therefore, if something like a functional
probability remains, we might possibly need to continue to rely on
institutions more similar to what we have now that are not necessarily
“properly” grounded.
On a side note, I am curious to know thoughts on the grounds of science.
[BXB] I stated that above but I am equally curious about your application of
utilitarianism as a means of mitigating the question of determinism vs
randomness.
Sincerely
Bernard
(bxbovasso)