Heidegger

Cologne 29-Oct-2007

Bernx at aol.com schrieb Sun, 28 Oct 2007 21:48:37 EDT:

> In a message dated 10/28/2007 6:13:22 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
> artefact at t-online.de writes:
>
> Heidegger often renders “phenomenon”, “das Phänomen” as “das
> Sichzeigende”,
> i.e. literally “that which shows itself”. Modern English is
> a poor language
> for this, because it does not have many reflexive verbs
> (unlike German), and
> has no MIDDLE voice at all (unlike ancient Greek). To
> translate German
> reflexive verbs, English usually (misleadingly) resorts to
> PASSIVE voice. Thus, for example, “Es zeigt sich, daß…” is
> rendered “It becomes apparent that…” A key word in
> phenomenology, namely “phenomenon”, is from Gk.
> _phainomenon_, the present participle in the middle or
> passive voice of _phainein_ employed as a noun. The middle
> voice character of _to phainomenon_ comes across in German
> by rendering it as “das Sichzeigende”, literally, “that
> which shows itself”, whereas modern English resorts
> invariably to a passive construction, “that which is shown”.
> The excellent standard reference Benseler says of _to
> phainomenon_ “der Schein, das was sich jmdm. in der
> Erscheinung so zeigt”, i.e. “the manifestation, that which
> shows itself to someone in the appearance”, as opposed to
> “_to dokoun_, was er in seinen Gedanken dafür hält” (”what
> he holds to be in his thoughts”). _To dokoun_ is what seems
> to be and what is held to be such-and-such in opinion
> (_doxa_).
>
> Michael;It becomes apparent here that the German syntax projects the
> “I” (ego) into *phenomenon* so that it is able to speak for itself
> (”that which shows itself”). The object (phenomenon) as such is thus
> allowed an autonomy be depriving the ego of its “I-ness.” But then
> the object in turn loses its “thatness” as object “out there” (”that
> which is shown”) which it would be less in passive voice (in English)
> insofar as “thatness” indicates the separateness of subject and
> object.

ME: This is far too convoluted, and it presupposes the ego as the
fundamentum absolutum from which all else is projected, which is
precisely what is at issue. The ego first became subject in modern
(Cartesian) metaphysics; in the Middle Ages, by contrast, the human
being was the obiectum of the supreme being, God. “Thatness” as a
philosophical term is simply that a being is, its existence (not in
Heidegger’s sense of Existenz). Thatness is the complement of whatness,
quidditas. In Latin, “subiectum” is the translation of Gk.
_hypokeimenon_, “that which underlies”. What is still subiectum in Latin
philosophy becomes in the modern age the object, i.e. “that which is
thrown toward the subject”, namely, the ego cogito as the posited
fundamentum absolutum. Along with this goes a turning topsy-turvy of an
historical world.

>
> In this sense, English, following Latin is significatory (semiotic)
> whereas the reflexive German remains comfortable with connotation and
> that which remains in contingency to the symbolic.

ME: Latin’s affinity to the Greek, especially in philosophy, is much
stronger than English’s, which became a philosophical language only in
the modern age in the struggle to establish the ego cogito (against
medieval Christian metaphysics) as the subject underlying all that is
(which today has become a self-evident, unquestioned piece of
common-sense, the death of all philosophy).

Latin also has plenty of reflexive verbs, e.g. sibi consciscere = sich
entschließen = lit. to resolve oneself to…, or sibi conscire = sich
bewußt sein = lit. to be aware oneself of…

Modern German still makes lavish use of reflexive verbs, which are close
to Gk. middle voice, in contrast to English, which, philosophically
speaking, is the language of modern subjectivist metaphysics. For sound
English common-sense, the only subject is the human subject; it is
unable to think anything else as subiectum, and overlooks even the hints
that the English language itself provides. E.g. in modern German one can
say “Eine Tür verbirgt sich hinter dem Schrank.”, literally “A door
hides itself behind the cupboard”, which however is automatically
rendered in English in the passive voice “A door is hidden behind the
cupboard”. In English we then go in search of the subject who hid the
door behind the cupboard, but even English has the usage of an
impersonal passive for which no (human-like) subject is even tacitly
presupposed. When we say in English, “The sun is hidden behind the
mountain”, we’re not implying that someone hid the sun behind the
mountain. Similarly, when in German we say, “Die Sonne verbirgt sich
hinter dem Berg,” lit. “The sun hides itself behind the mountain,” we
are not suggesting that the sun is like a human subject playing
hide-and-seek. The same holds true ceteris paribus when we say in
English, “The sun now shows itself from behind the mountain.” We thus
see that, even in English, one does not have to resort always to passive
constructions, and the example does not imply any solar animism at which
smart (i.e. super-stupid) Anglo-Saxon common-sense could poke fun at. So
there is hope yet for English as a philosophical language, but only when
those rare ones with sufficient linguistic sensibility and knowledge of
established philosophical languages (notably ancient Greek) start to
exploit the latent possibilities still slumbering in English.

_-_-_-_-_-_-_- artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_- artefact at t-online.de _-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_

> The symbolic is, however, open ended and cannot be confined as a
> limited signification. This is a special problem in English where the
> semiotic is invariably used intechangeably with the symbolic
> indicating as such that signification (as sign) is easily confounded
> for the connotative symbol. My only explanation for this is that the
> German has an extensive built in use for *ur* in its predications
> whereas English does not so that, for example, *ur-gestalt* remains an
> empty class because it eludes the fixity of sign and signification. As
> a resutl the *ur* reality is only addressed in English by the
> predicate of negation and by which it is desubstantiated, eg., the ur
> reality as the “un”-conscious. On the other hand the only English word
> that implies ur-ness is “original” qua *ur-iginal.* In the Greek this
> is served as *archai* and which also retains ur-ness. Unfortuantely,
> however, for the most part, ur and archai are reduced simply to “old”
> or prime in the sense of “first” thus confounding *the original* as in
> the past. In English, for example, the word *archetype* subordinates
> the *arche* to *typos* (”stamping” as significatory) and conveniently
> losing arche and ur-ness. Hence, semiotics displaces the symbolical in
> English and perhaps in the Romance Languages (the Latin vulgate). But
> however the reflexive is compared to the passive syntax ur-ness for
> the latter is distorted as merely a premise predicated in negation.
> But the difference suggests that the in-here-ness of *ur* may account
> for the German problem with *sein* and the need for Heidegger to
> advocate dasein and thus enjoy the object nature (in the world) by
> which object and being may be accommodated. To say this a German
> “problem,” however is misleading insofar as the Germanic consciousness
> qua the linguistic enjoys (or suffers) a radical difference to the
> “allies” of the Anglo/Latinate indicating, notwithstanding English as
> essentially Anglo-Saxon as such that whereas Ceasar and Rome Romanized
> Britain it could not do as much for the Germans east of the Rhine much
> less the Weser.Sincerely;Bernard

Posted on Monday, October 29th, 2007 at 5:00 pm
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