Discovery vs Disclosure
October 30th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Discovery vs Disclosure :: [epistemology] Discovery vs Disclosure :: Discovery vs Disclosure* :: Discovery vs Disclosure*
MichaelE to Joe recntly:
> And, as I pointed out in my last
> post, the ink-blot’s showing of itself AS such is enabled by the category of
> SOMETHING, a phenomenon the Greek philosophers could still see, but we
> smarties today, blinded by Cartesian and British empiricist prejudice, no
> longer can see.
Michael, I can see in your lucidity two (different but belonging-together)
notions of be-ing (which I think stems from some where in Aristotle) which
can be phrased in terms of categories as you do:
1) the category of ’something’; for me: thatness, that something is, that
is: is not nothing; standing out against nothingness.
2) the category (for example) of image (say, an inkblot); for me: whatness,
what something is, that is: is not something else; standing out against
elsewise.
Both embrace a difference in standing out (ex-sists): not nothing; not
something else. In this way, both prescribe be-ing in terms of difference.
Without that difference (it’s the same difference-qua-difference) we can not
*say* anything about anything (even if we can and do endlessly *speak* such
nonsense which explicitly or implicitly precludes or obliviates such
difference; and here’s the rub: even such nonsense (refusing the difference)
requires the difference even to speak such ‘falsity’ at all).
Or have I gotten this all diddley-squat?
regards
michaelP
