Heidegger

Bernx at aol.com wrote:

> artefact at t-online.de writes:
>
>>Heidegger often renders “phenomenon”, “das Phänomen” as “das
>>Sichzeigende”, i.e. literally “that which shows itself”. Modern
>>English is a poor language for this, because it does not have many
>>reflexive verbs (unlike German), and has no MIDDLE voice at all
>>(unlike ancient Greek). To translate German reflexive verbs, English
>>usually (misleadingly) resorts to PASSIVE voice. Thus, for example, “Es
>>zeigt sich, daß…” is rendered “It becomes apparent that…” A key
>>word in phenomenology, namely “phenomenon”, is from Gk. _phainomenon_,
>>the present participle in the middle or passive voice of _phainein_
>>employed as a noun. The middle voice character of _to phainomenon_
>>comes across in German by rendering it as “das Sichzeigende”,
>>literally, “that which shows itself”, whereas modern English resorts
>>invariably to a passive construction, “that which is shown”. The
>>excellent standard reference Benseler says of _to phainomenon_ “der
>>Schein, das was sich jmdm. in der Erscheinung so zeigt”, i.e. “the
>>manifestation, that which shows itself to someone in the appearance”,
>>as opposed to “_to dokoun_, was er in seinen Gedanken dafür hält”
>>(”what he holds to be in his thoughts”). _To dokoun_ is what seems to
>>be and what is held to be such-and-such in opinion (_doxa_).
>
>*Michael;* *It becomes apparent here that the German syntax projects
>the “I” (ego) into *phenomenon* so that it is able to speak for itself
>(*”that which shows itself”)*. The object (phenomenon) as such is thus
>allowed an autonomy be depriving the ego of its “I-ness.” But then the
>object in turn loses its “thatness” as object “out there” (*”that which
>is shown”) which it would be less in passive voice (in English) insofar
>as “thatness” indicates the separateness of subject and object. In this
>sense, English, following Latin is significatory (semiotic) whereas the
>reflexive German remains comfortable with connotation and that which
>remains in contingency to the symbolic. The symbolic is, however, open
>ended and cannot be confined as a limited signification. This is a
>special problem in English where the semiotic is invariably used
>intechangeably with the symbolic indicating as such that signification
>(as sign) is easily confounded for the connotative symbol.

Bernard’s diagnosis is very insightful. a native speaker of english,
when told that a paperweight discloses itself, would feel that something
is being taken away from the consciousness of the experiencing subject
and given to an inanimate object.

however, I would like to add two comments as to Michael’s analysis
quoted above.

1: if you think you know that english has few reflexive verbs and no
middle voice; then, you are foolish to insist on translating Heidegger’s
vocabulary so literally.

2: you could hardly be more wrong. english *has* a middle voice; english
*has* reflexive verbs; and, you are probably mistaken as to the relation
between the use of the middle voice and the uses of reflexive verbs.

in english, the middle voice is rather amorphous and includes several
otherwise unrelated uses that do not cleanly fit into the active voice /
passive voice dichotomy.

1. neither active nor passive

I experience is neither active nor passive. I do not ‘do’ the
experiencing; but, neither is the experiencing done to me.

Neil Levy, in “Libet’s Impossible Demain” [Journal of Consciousness
Studies. 2005. 12(12):73] wrote:

“I realize, it strikes me, I recognize, I comprehend. These words,
which we use to refer to our coming to understand something or to
appreciate its significance, are poised between activity and passivity.”

in plain language, they are middle voiced because they are neither
active nor passive.

2. the subject of the sentence is the object of the verb’s action

Consider a somewhat idiomatic sentence: the casserole cooks in the oven.

the verb cooks looks like it is in the active form but is used as an
intransitive verb (ie without an object). the subject of the sentence is
actually the object of the verb’s action. the cook who is doing the
cooking is not mentioned in the sentence; but, no english speaker would
say that the casserole is cooking itself.

3. the subject/actor is also the object of the verb’s action.

this is the type of middle voice associated with reflexive verbs.

“I wash the car” — this is an ordinary active verb.

“I wash (myself)” — this is reflexive because the subject of the
sentence is both the agent and the object of the verb’s action.

note that the ‘(myself)’ does not have to be spoken; it will be
understood.

a small number of active verbs have a reflexive useage because of an
understood object; but, most active verbs can be made reflexive just by
prepending it with ’self-’.

for example, when I left my parent’s home and got my own apartment I
learned to cook for myself. I became self-feeding.

some people are said to be self-motivated etc.

the important point to remember, here, is that an active reflexive verb
that is made reflexive in this way is still active. it is very difficult
to construct construct sentences where the subject is an inanimate
object and the verb is reflexive. one possible example: global warming
is a self-correcting phenomenon because it will trigger an ice age. or
maybe I should say ‘the earth self-corrects climate disturbances’

but, in most cases, a sentence with an inanimate object
as the subject of the sentence, treats the subject of the sentence as
the agent and recipient of the reflexive verb’s action.

***

If you want to translate phenomenological texts or statements into
english and you want to retain the middle voice flavor of the ancient
greek, use the first form of the middle voice I gave above.

‘appears’ is good for this purpose and is the way most sensible
translators of phenomenological texts would say what you appear to want
to say.

consider ‘that object appears to be a stone’. the appearance of the
stone to the experiencing subject captures the intentionality of
phenomenological description without attributing self-action to the
stone.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Thursday, November 8th, 2007 at 6:30 pm
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