Discovery vs Disclosure
October 28th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Discovery vs Disclosure :: [epistemology] Discovery vs Disclosure :: Discovery vs Disclosure* :: Discovery vs Disclosure*
Cologne 28-Oct-2007
Joseph Polanik http://what-am-i.net schrieb Sat, 27 Oct 2007 06:14:36 -0400:
> Michael Eldred wrote:
> >
> > Joseph Polanik schrieb :
> >
> >>Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> >>>No being _is_ without showing itself _as_ such-and-such for
> >>>understanding. So the being of a being and the disclosure of that
> >>>being belong together
>
> >>from the first person perspective of this being-here looking at
> >>objects which are merely existential realities (physical beings, or
> >>physical realities), the observing I does the discovering. the object
> >>lacks the capacity to disclose itself.
>
> >ME: If the “physical being” does not show itself AS such-and-such, the
> >”I” cannot discover it.
>
> it is certainly true that if a physical entity is not such-and-such,
> this being-here can not accurately discover that it is such-and-such.
>
> however, this simple observation does not tell us whether the
> entity-there does the disclosing or whether the being-here does the
> discovering.
ME: You offer here an either-or alternative. But this is not a case of “vs”
(see below).
> >>if you look at an inkblot and see a bat, it is not the inkblot that is
> >>disclosing itself. you who look at the inkblot are self-disclosing.
> >>the bat is ‘there’ because you put it there.
>
> >If I look at an ink-blot, it has already shown itself AS SOMETHING;
> >otherwise I could not see it.
>
> the question is: did the inkblot show itself to be the bat or did you
> discover the bat in the inkblot?
ME: Here there are at least three steps that lead successively deeper into
the ontological structure:
i) The viewer sees the ink-blot as (the representation of) a bat. (Presumably
your example refers to the Rorschach-test sitiuation.) Insofar, the viewer
also sees the ink-blot AS ink-blot and understands the difference between the
ink-blot and (representation of) a bat.
ii) The viewer sees the ink-blot itself, ontologically prior to seeing it as
(the representation of) a bat.
iii) More originarily, the viewer sees the ink-blot (and presumably also the
piece of paper bearing the ink-blot) AS SOMETHING. This is the most
ontologically originary seeing (so far) in this example.
>
> >>at the subatomic level, particles do not even have definite values for
> >>their dynamic properties — until observed. so, the particle does not
> >>disclose itself. the observer discovers its values when the
> >>observation forces the wave function to collapse the superposition of
> >>all posssibilities into a single definite value.
>
> >At the “subatomic level” there is no simple looking-at (Anschauung,
> >intuition) — what shows itself shows itself only in the light of the
> >noetic-theoretic concepts that construe certain phenomena (in certain
> >apparatuses constructed according to the physical theory) AS the
> >appearance of “particles”, “wave functions”, etc.
>
> yes, it takes considerable apparatus to observe a subatomic particle;
> but, the question is: does the particle disclose itself or does the
> physicist discover its properties?
>
> how can a particle disclose its dynamic properties (eg its spin) when
> those properties don’t even have definite values in between
> observations of that property?
>
> did the number 3 disclose itself as a prime number; or, did some ancient
> mathematician discover that three was a prime number?
ME: Again you offer only an either-or choice between a subject discovering or
a being disclosing itself. Why not both or why not a third alternative? To
return to your simple example of sensuous perception: the ink-blot discloses
itself, first and foremost, AS SOMETHING, AND ALSO the viewer discovers the
ink-blot AS SOMETHING (on being presented with a piece of paper with an
ink-blot on it). The category of SOMETHING must already be understood for the
viewer to see the ink-blot AS SOMETHING of such-and-such a kind. Similarly,
the ink-blot discloses itself AS SOMETHING only within the open space of
being-here, i.e. the Da in Heidegger’s terminology. Where does this SOMETHING
come from? The ink-blot is SOMETHING in itself, and the viewer also discovers
it AS SOMETHING, but SOMETHING pure and simple is interposed between — that
is the ontological difference, i.e. the difference between the being (here,
the ink-blot) and its being (AS SOMETHING), which, in a singular instance,
can also be discovered by a viewer. The singular instance of discovering an
ink-blot, and understanding it i) AS (the representation of) a bat, ii) AS an
ink-blot and iii) AS SOMETHING, presupposes ontologically that the viewer
always already (i.e. a priori) understands what SOMETHING is. SOMETHING is
therefore in between the subject (the viewer) and the object (the ink-blot).
The category of SOMETHING is a subject-object, in between. The alternative of
either-or overlooks what is always already ontologically presupposed i.e. a
priori present.
So here we are phenomenologically redicovering Plato’s _idea_, Aristotle’s
_kataegoriai_ or Hegel’s “Idee” — viz. the subject-object in between. In the
present elementary example, the subject-object the category of SOMETHING. The
category of SOMETHING is always already discovered (understood) and always
already disclosed as one category in the ontological structure of world. The
categories are the PREDICAMENTA (Latin for _kataegoriai_) through which the
ink-blot shows itself AS a being, and these predicaments can also be
PREDICATED of the being in a _logos_, a propositio. What is predicated of the
being, however, is derivative of its predicaments, and not the originary
phenomenon.
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_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
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