Heidegger

> michaelP wrote:
>
> >To those that think in an overly linear fashion (e.g., one that is
> >saturated with mathematical logic and other technics), Heidegger’s
> >disdain for squaring the circle, dissolving paradoxes and viscous [sic]
> >circles in the cheap acid of too hastily applied logical apparatuses,
> >hammering home the non-literary non-merely-word-play ‘point’ of
> >chiasmuses, etc, must appear as a display of error of logic or a
> >dismissal of it:

Joe responds with:

> some Heideggerians seem willing to follow Heidegger in his departure
> from the way of the Logos; but, few are equally willing to admit having
> done so.

Firstly, Joe, I refuse the notion that Heidegger’s thinking has departed
from “the way of the Logos”, on the contrary: his thinkerly concern has been
all along with _logos_ its self. My main point (and for the below dwelling
in a previous discussion) is that what you call “Logos” (and its possible
abdication) is in effect one of the many ways in which the Logos has
appeared: (mathematical) predicational logic. In that sense, I am
consistently saying that this appearance of Logos, predicational logic, is
*secondary not primary*, being precisely an appearance of _logos_ and one
that obfuscates its ancestory, provenance and _arche_. And this is behind my
comment in that earlier conversation that one should perhaps firstly think
the be-ing of predication rather than speak interminably of predicating
be-ing (since the possibility of the latter lies unwittingly (perhaps) with
the former). In other words, logic (and the predicational practices it both
illuminates and restricts to [sic]) is secondary to _logos_ which
possibilises all intelligibility of all discourses (whether predicational or
otherwise). In yet other words, Heidegger’s turn (as I have understood it)
is not a departure (from logic) but a step back (to _logos_), not a dismal
dismissal but an archaeology, not the sleep of reason but an awakening of
its _arche_.

> In my post of 2008-01-13, I replied to you by saying:
>
> “in a previous post I indicated that the road forked at the point where
> predication is defined as ’saying something about something’.
>
> “I accept this definition as meaning the same as ’saying something
> about something that is not nothing’.
>
> “you apparently accept this definition as meaning the same as ’saying
> something about something — including something that is nothing’.
>
> “I’ve given you my justifications for my reading of ’saying something
> about something’. what are your justifications for your reading?”
>
> it is one thing to complain that the way of the Logos is too confining;
> but, if that is your compaint is, why are you unwilling to acknowledge
> your own departure.

As above, I am not saying (and certainly not complaining) that logic is
confining, rather that it is not primary (it is one of the many ways that
_logos_ can show its self) and is thus dependent: the be-ing of logic is
nothing logical. There is a limit or bound to logic that logic its self can
not its self discern (because it is ‘only’ an appearance of, a mode of, what
is first, primary; and it ‘works’, succeeds, only because it is a mode of
_logos_ that gets productively on with business rather than contemplating
the businessing itself; but that’s why we have philosophy…).

> do you claim the power to attribute predicates to nothing(ness) or do
> you not?

Anyone can say (in the sense of speak concretely) anything about anything.
Any “power” to (meaningfully) predicate anything is not mine or any
speaker’s. Of course, one *can* claim anything. For me, predicating be-ing
is ‘impossible’ in the sense of being pointless; such an act could only
begin to be worthwhile if such an attempt at the (analytically) impossible
led to an understanding and analysis of its impossibility and thus led on to
a discussion as to the be-ing of predicating itself.

Oh, and by the way, Joe, I shall not go down the same kind of path you have
had with Anthony: if you bring up interesting written arguments to me in any
present posting, I shall respond to what interests me there or seems
relevant to my concerns. Otherwise, I shan’t [unless we start discussing the
be-ing of discursive practices themselves].

> Joe

regards

michaelP

Posted on Sunday, June 8th, 2008 at 6:00 am
comment | rss 2.0 | trackback