Heidegger

michaelP wrote:

>jPolanik wrote:

>>michaelP wrote:

>>>To those that think in an overly linear fashion (e.g., one that is
>>>saturated with mathematical logic and other technics), Heidegger’s
>>>disdain for squaring the circle, dissolving paradoxes and viscous
>>>[sic] circles in the cheap acid of too hastily applied logical
>>>apparatuses, hammering home the non-literary non-merely-word-play
>>>’point’ of chiasmuses, etc, must appear as a display of error of
>>>logic or a dismissal of it:

>>some Heideggerians seem willing to follow Heidegger in his departure
>>from the way of the Logos; but, few are equally willing to admit
>>having done so.

>Firstly, Joe, I refuse the notion that Heidegger’s thinking has
>departed from “the way of the Logos”, on the contrary: his thinkerly
>concern has been all along with _logos_ its self. My main point (and
>for the below dwelling in a previous discussion) is that what you call
>”Logos” (and its possible abdication) is in effect one of the many ways
>in which the Logos has appeared: (mathematical) predicational logic. In
>that sense, I am consistently saying that this appearance of Logos,
>predicational logic, is *secondary not primary*, being precisely an
>appearance of _logos_ and one that obfuscates its ancestory, provenance
>and _arche_. And this is behind my comment in that earlier conversation
>that one should perhaps firstly think the be-ing of predication rather
>than speak interminably of predicating be-ing (since the possibility of
>the latter lies unwittingly (perhaps) with the former). In other words,
>logic (and the predicational practices it both illuminates and
>restricts to [sic]) is secondary to _logos_ which possibilises all
>intelligibility of all discourses (whether predicational or otherwise).
>In yet other words, Heidegger’s turn (as I have understood it) is not a
>departure (from logic) but a step back (to _logos_), not a dismal
>dismissal but an archaeology, not the sleep of reason but an awakening
>of its _arche_.

irregardless of whether the Logos appears in ways other than predicate
logic;

irregardless of whether predicate logic is primary or secondary;

irregardless of whether predicate logic clarifies or obscures its arche;

you did not answer my question:

>>do you claim the power to attribute predicates to nothing(ness) or do
>>you not?

>Oh, and by the way, Joe, I shall not go down the same kind of path you
>have had with Anthony: if you bring up interesting written arguments to
>me in any present posting, I shall respond to what interests me there
>or seems relevant to my concerns. Otherwise, I shan’t [unless we start
>discussing the be-ing of discursive practices themselves].

that’s okay.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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Posted on Sunday, June 8th, 2008 at 6:01 am
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