Heidegger

mP:

> >>>To those that think in an overly linear fashion (e.g., one that is
> >>>saturated with mathematical logic and other technics), Heidegger’s
> >>>disdain for squaring the circle, dissolving paradoxes and viscous
> >>>[sic] circles in the cheap acid of too hastily applied logical
> >>>apparatuses, hammering home the non-literary non-merely-word-play
> >>>’point’ of chiasmuses, etc, must appear as a display of error of
> >>>logic or a dismissal of it:

Joe:

> >>some Heideggerians seem willing to follow Heidegger in his departure
> >>from the way of the Logos; but, few are equally willing to admit
> >>having done so.

mP:

> >Firstly, Joe, I refuse the notion that Heidegger’s thinking has
> >departed from “the way of the Logos”, on the contrary: his thinkerly
> >concern has been all along with _logos_ its self. My main point (and
> >for the below dwelling in a previous discussion) is that what you call
> >”Logos” (and its possible abdication) is in effect one of the many ways
> >in which the Logos has appeared: (mathematical) predicational logic. In
> >that sense, I am consistently saying that this appearance of Logos,
> >predicational logic, is *secondary not primary*, being precisely an
> >appearance of _logos_ and one that obfuscates its ancestory, provenance
> >and _arche_. And this is behind my comment in that earlier conversation
> >that one should perhaps firstly think the be-ing of predication rather
> >than speak interminably of predicating be-ing (since the possibility of
> >the latter lies unwittingly (perhaps) with the former). In other words,
> >logic (and the predicational practices it both illuminates and
> >restricts to [sic]) is secondary to _logos_ which possibilises all
> >intelligibility of all discourses (whether predicational or otherwise).
> >In yet other words, Heidegger’s turn (as I have understood it) is not a
> >departure (from logic) but a step back (to _logos_), not a dismal
> >dismissal but an archaeology, not the sleep of reason but an awakening
> >of its _arche_.

Joe:

> irregardless of whether the Logos appears in ways other than predicate
> logic;
>
> irregardless of whether predicate logic is primary or secondary;
>
> irregardless of whether predicate logic clarifies or obscures its arche;
>
> you did not answer my question:
>
> >>do you claim the power to attribute predicates to nothing(ness) or do
> >>you not?

mP:

Joe, from everything I said concerning firstness and secondness and that
concretely one can speak any old thing, etc, did you not catch my
effectively saying that your question is entirely *irrelevant* for me, and
thus it makes no philosophical sense to answer it, especially with your
requested yes or no? To answer your question in *that* way (yes/no) is for
me to philosophically deny my own critique of the strictly predicational
language and technics that you employ (the beginnings of such critique
{crisis: a turning on a laying out}, however vague to the binary truth-value
mechanisms of your speech/calculus, were outlined in my last post (and in
previous posts) along with an indication of my fork/turn in the path {to
attempt to think the be-ing of predication rather than continue with
attempting predicating be-ing along with predication’s possibilities and
limits, etc, however tempting for you…}). On this I think we should be
most *regardful* if we are to continue to speak philosophically with each
other. You appear to have been literally regardless concerning my points in
the last post (which you have ruthlessly enumerated above) and only seem to
want to pursue, nay prosecute, your enquiries like the prosecutor in a court
of law. You have disregarded my non-yes/no answers as not being within your
allowed responses, but they *are* answers, and perhaps you could consider
them so we can perhaps turn at this fork in the road…?

regards!

michaelP

Posted on Sunday, June 8th, 2008 at 6:01 am
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