Heidegger

Cologne 01-Jan-2006

GEVANS613 at aol.com schrieb Sun, 31 Dec 2006 09:25:51 EST:

> In a message dated 31/12/2006 12:47:23 GMT Standard Time,
> artefact at t-online.de writes:
>
> Cologne 31-Dec-2006
>
> ME: Eliminativism is truly (self-)eliminating; it is
> understanding that does not
> realize what it is saying.
> The principal truth of eliminativism is:
> You name it, it doesn’t exist.
>
> Jud:This is tired old-hat stuff Dr Eldred - you are capable
> of much better quality criticism.The *self* doesn’t exist
> and neither does *Eliminativism* - so how could something
> that does not exist *eliminate* something else that doesn’t
> exist?That is gobble-de-gook. The eliminativist emloys
> [makes use of] verbal signs in order to communicate.
>
> Some of those signs [words] are correspond [stand for]
> actual objects which are named. Such existing objects which
> are [sucessfully] named are known as *nominata* - *that
> which is/are named.* Thus in the expression: *I drove my car
> to London* the word *car* signifies an object which, if
> called upon to do so, I could drive to your house, park it
> outside, and you could come to the kerb and examine it. Thus
> the object referred to by the significand *car* actually
> exists.However, in the expression: *John’s dancing is highly
> professional and wonderfully performed.* the word dancing
> [here technically called a *gerund*]does not exist. I could
> not bring you *John’s dancing* because it does not exist -
> only John [who occassionally or often exists in a
> neuro-physical state of body movements we describe as
> *dancing* exists. Thus the word *dancing* is NOT a
> nominatum but a designatum, in that whilst it designates a
> particular existential modality of an object - it does not
> nominate an actual object.Thus you can inspect my car and
> kick the tyres, but you cannot inspect its *performance*
> because it *performance* does not exist - only the
> performing car exists. If you sat in the car and I put it
> through its paces it is THE CAR you would be observing -
> not its performance.
>
> Dr. Eldred:
> According to eliminativism, only singularities exist;
> universals do not exist.Jud:True.
>
> Dr. Eldred:To name anything, even if only to address it as
> ‘it’ or as a ’singularity’, is
> to assert the existence of a universal, for ‘it’ and
> ’singularity’ are
> universals.
>
> Jud:Untrue.The pronoun *it* refers to both singularities and
> universals. When I knock on your door to inform you that my
> car is parked by the kerb awaiting your inspection I can
> say: *I have brought the car for you to see - *IT* is parked
> by the kerb.* This mechanism is a stylistic device to avoid
> repetition and avoids the clumsy construction: *I have
> brought the car for you to see - the car is parked by the
> kerb.*On the other hand in the sentence: *The universe is
> vast - it comprises of countless trillions of stars and
> other cosmic objects.* then the pronoun *IT*is referring to
> multiple objects as one, and is semantically and logically
> imperfect.Interestingly the science of mereology has become
> involved in such questions - but that is an area I will
> ignore just now, though I am perfectly willing to enter
> into a mereological discussion at any time.
>
> Dr Eldred:To say anything at all is to say universals. To
> name any singularity is to say it is a universal, even if
> one says a tautology.
>
> Jud:Wrong.You forget about the nominational implication or
> designatory descrimination implied, inferred, deduced and
> derived both by the addressor and addressee in such
> sentences, together with the employment of the definite or
> indefinate article. Antecedal [historical] sentential
> implication also plays an important part in the negation or
> instantion or representation of a form or an instance of
> universalisation.Thus: the sentence. *The frog hopped on to
> the lillypad* nominates a PARTICULAR frog and a PARTICULAR
> lillypad. You can be sure that in such a construction the
> speaker/writer has or will either:
>
ME: Here you confuse particularity with singularity. Particularity is
merely the way a universal breaks down or particularizes itself into
species, as in “The daffodil is a flower.”

>
> (A) Have referred to the frog or lillypad in some earlier
> dialogue or text.(B) Will contine by introducing additional
> information concerning the frog or lillypad in a subsequent
> sentence or sentences, in which the precise nature of the
> frog and/or lillypad is added to establish its ontological
> singularity.It can clearly be seen from the above that what
> is addressed is a single unique frog and a single unique
> lillpad and NOT all the frogs and lillypads in the cosmos.
>
ME: Here, having already confused singularity with particularity, you
now confuse generality with universality (das allen Gemeinsame with das
Allgemeine).. A universal does necessarily refer to all members of a
class. In fact, in the statement, “This is a singularity.”,
“singularity” is a universal. All of the three categories in the triad
singularity, particularity and universality are universals. And no
singularity (i.e. unique, single being) can be addressed by language
without raising it to the level of universality (NOT generality). “This
is a frog,” e.g. connects a singularity with a universal, viz. “frog”.
So the statement has a contradiction within itself, something that mere
understanding must overlook to stick to its abstract, common-sense
identities that (unsuccessfully attempt to) avoid contradiction like the
plague. The tangle of terminological jargon of your eliminativism is
elaborate camouflage for having overlooked the simplest and deepest
insights of philosophy.

_-_-_-_-_-_-_- artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_- artefact at t-online.de _-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_

> Dr. Eldred:Furthermore, to say anything that is not a mere
> tautology is to say that something is what it is not, i.e.
> to say anything is a contradiction. (Anything that exists is
> a contradiction — a truth that understanding cannot
> understand.) Jud:For me tautologous constructions are simply
> ontological verifications or clarificational statements of
> TWTWI [the way the world is]Thus the neccessarily true
> statement: “‘He is brave or he is not brave’ is a useful
> tautology in that it highlights the question of whether
> *bravery* is an absolute which goes right back to the
> interminable attempts by Plato [through the clack-jaw of his
> Socratic ventriloqist’s doll] to define such abstract
> nouns. For the eliminativist no such definitional problem
> exists of course, for * bravery* no any other abstract
> useful fiction [including *Being* does not exist. Only
> humans who are judged to act in a manner which corresponds
> with or to a certain individual’s understanding of what it
> means to be brave exist.
> Dr. Eldred:
> Eliminativism is an inverted mirror-image of sophistry. The
> sophists claimed
> that what does not exist cannot be said (because, following
> Parmenides, they
> claimed that non-being simply _is_ not). so that everything
> they said was
> necessarily true.Jud:I agree with the spirit of Parmenides’
> observation but not with his conclusions.Whilst I agree
> wholeheartedly that *non-being* simply *is* not I do NOT
> agree that such references to useful fictions should benot
> be employed [*cannot be said* in his words.]In that sense
> Parmenides was a much more radical eliminativist that I am,
> for he seems to have councelled the ACTUAL ERASURE of
> linguistic names, terms and references which have no
> nominatum in the real world. The modern eliminativist
> recognises the vital importance of abstraction in human
> communication, but does not seek to eliminate or erase such
> terminology from human discourse, rather he or she seeks to
> educate people as to the dangers of reifying such helpful
> fictional forms into real or quasi-real [ideational objects]
> which people like Heidegger did, to the great detriment and
> damage of philosophy.Dr. Eldred:The eliminativist says, on
> the contrary, that for all x, x does not exist, and
> eliminativism is therefore self-obliterative although,
> unfortunately, due to its irrepressible opinionatedness, it
> is not self-effacive. Jud:Wrong again. The eliminativist
> does not simply say * for all x, x does not exist* - he or
> she says: *Though for all X *X* does not exist, *X* is
> acceptable in language as a communicational convenience
> UNLESS its role of being suitable or opportuneinstrument
> ambage-avoidance, or as a tool to avoid time-consuming
> periphrasis and wasteful circumlocution is not abused by the
> naive, the brainwashed or the simply uncontrollable
> opinionated or employed rhetorically for evil purposes as in
> the case of Hitler and Heidegger.
>
> regards,
>
> Jud Evans.
> Personal Website:
> http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…
>
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Posted on Monday, January 1st, 2007 at 2:05 pm
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