Heidegger

In a message dated 31/12/2006 12:47:23 GMT Standard Time,
artefact at t-online.de writes:

Cologne 31-Dec-2006

ME: Eliminativism is truly (self-)eliminating; it is understanding that does
not
realize what it is saying.
The principal truth of eliminativism is:
You name it, it doesn’t exist.

Jud:
This is tired old-hat stuff Dr Eldred - you are capable of much better
quality criticism.
The *self* doesn’t exist and neither does *Eliminativism* - so how could
something that does not exist *eliminate* something else that doesn’t exist?
That is gobble-de-gook.

The eliminativist emloys [makes use of] verbal signs in order to commun
icate. Some of those signs [words] are correspond [stand for] actual objects
which are named. Such existing objects which are [sucessfully] named are known as
*nominata* - *that which is/are named.*

Thus in the expression: *I drove my car to London* the word *car* signifies
an object which, if called upon to do so, I could drive to your house, park
it outside, and you could come to the kerb and examine it. Thus the object
referred to by the significand *car* actually exists.

However, in the expression: *John’s dancing is highly professional and
wonderfully performed.* the word dancing [here technically called a *gerund*]
does not exist. I could not bring you *John’s dancing* because it does not
exist - only John [who occassionally or often exists in a neuro-physical
state of body movements we describe as *dancing* exists. Thus the word *dancing*
is NOT a nominatum but a designatum, in that whilst it designates a
particular existential modality of an object - it does not nominate an actual object.
Thus you can inspect my car and kick the tyres, but you cannot inspect its
*performance* because it *performance* does not exist - only the performing
car exists. If you sat in the car and I put it through its paces it is THE
CAR you would be observing - not its performance.

Dr. Eldred:
According to eliminativism, only singularities exist; universals do not
exist.

Jud:
True.

Dr. Eldred:
To name anything, even if only to address it as ‘it’ or as a ’singularity’,
is
to assert the existence of a universal, for ‘it’ and ’singularity’ are
universals.

Jud:
Untrue.
The pronoun *it* refers to both singularities and universals. When I knock
on your door to inform you that my car is parked by the kerb awaiting your
inspection I can say:

*I have brought the car for you to see - *IT* is parked by the kerb.* This
mechanism is a stylistic device to avoid repetition and avoids the clumsy
construction:

*I have brought the car for you to see - the car is parked by the kerb.*

On the other hand in the sentence: *The universe is vast - it comprises of
countless trillions of stars and other cosmic objects.* then the pronoun *IT*
is referring to multiple objects as one, and is semantically and logically
imperfect.

Interestingly the science of mereology has become involved in such questions
- but that is an area I will ignore just now, though I am perfectly willing
to enter into a mereological discussion at any time.

Dr Eldred:
To say anything at all is to say universals. To name any singularity is to
say it is a universal, even if one says a tautology.

Jud:
Wrong.
You forget about the nominational implication or designatory descrimination
implied, inferred, deduced and derived both by the addressor and addressee
in such sentences, together with the employment of the definite or indefinate
article. Antecedal [historical] sentential implication also plays an
important part in the negation or instantion or representation of a form or an
instance of universalisation.

Thus: the sentence. *The frog hopped on to the lillypad* nominates a
PARTICULAR frog and a PARTICULAR lillypad. You can be sure that in such a
construction the speaker/writer has or will either:

(A) Have referred to the frog or lillypad in some earlier dialogue or text.
(B) Will contine by introducing additional information concerning the frog
or lillypad in a subsequent sentence or sentences, in which the precise
nature of the frog and/or lillypad is added to establish its ontological
singularity.

It can clearly be seen from the above that what is addressed is a single
unique frog and a single unique lillpad and NOT all the frogs and lillypads in
the cosmos.

Dr. Eldred:
Furthermore, to say anything that is not a mere tautology is to say that
something is what it is not, i.e. to say anything is a contradiction. (Anything
that exists is a contradiction — a truth that understanding cannot
understand.)

Jud:
For me tautologous constructions are simply ontological verifications or
clarificational statements of TWTWI [the way the world is]
Thus the neccessarily true statement: “‘He is brave or he is not brave’ is a
useful tautology in that it highlights the question of whether *bravery* is
an absolute which goes right back to the interminable attempts by Plato
[through the clack-jaw of his Socratic ventriloqist’s doll] to define such
abstract nouns. For the eliminativist no such definitional problem exists of
course, for * bravery* no any other abstract useful fiction [including *Being*
does not exist. Only humans who are judged to act in a manner which corresponds
with or to a certain individual’s understanding of what it means to be brave
exist.

Dr. Eldred:
Eliminativism is an inverted mirror-image of sophistry. The sophists claimed
that what does not exist cannot be said (because, following Parmenides, they
claimed that non-being simply _is_ not). so that everything they said was
necessarily true.

Jud:
I agree with the spirit of Parmenides’ observation but not with his
conclusions.
Whilst I agree wholeheartedly that *non-being* simply *is* not I do NOT
agree that such references to useful fictions should be
not be employed [*cannot be said* in his words.]

In that sense Parmenides was a much more radical eliminativist that I am,
for he seems to have councelled the ACTUAL ERASURE of linguistic names, terms
and references which have no nominatum in the real world. The modern
eliminativist recognises the vital importance of abstraction in human communication,
but does not seek to eliminate or erase such terminology from human discourse,
rather he or she seeks to educate people as to the dangers of reifying such
helpful fictional forms into real or quasi-real [ideational objects] which
people like Heidegger did, to the great detriment and damage of philosophy.

Dr. Eldred:
The eliminativist says, on the contrary, that for all x, x does not exist,
and eliminativism is therefore self-obliterative although,
unfortunately, due to its irrepressible opinionatedness, it is not
self-effacive.

Jud:
Wrong again. The eliminativist does not simply say * for all x, x does not
exist* - he or she says:

*Though for all X *X* does not exist, *X* is acceptable in language as a
communicational convenience UNLESS its role of being suitable or opportune
instrument ambage-avoidance, or as a tool to avoid time-consuming
periphrasis and wasteful circumlocution is not abused by the naive, the brainwashed or
the simply uncontrollable opinionated or employed rhetorically for evil
purposes as in the case of Hitler and Heidegger.

regards,

Jud Evans.
Personal Website: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…

Posted on Sunday, December 31st, 2006 at 2:30 pm
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